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Articles
Custody and Contradictions:
Exploring Immigration Law as Federal Family
Law in the Context of Child Custody
DAVID B. THRONSON*
The Border Patrol arrested and processed for repatriation an
undocumented father who was detained along with his U.S. citizen
daughter who was in his care.' As the moment of repatriation approached,
the daughter's U.S. citizen mother appeared at the Border Patrol station
and demanded the child.' In the absence of a state court order awarding
her custody, the Border Patrol refused to turn over the child to the
mother.3 Later that day the child accompanied her father as he was
removed to Mexico, where she remained for three years.4 In subsequent
litigation regarding this matter, the U.S. government asserted that it had
"no policies, rules or statutes governing the apprehension and detention of
a foreign national [exercising] lawful custody of his or her U.S. juvenile
child. "5
In a contested child custody proceeding regarding undocumented
children, a state family court judge noted that the mother "is in this country
illegally. There's no way around that. ,6 Ordering primary physical custody
* Associate Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada Las
Vegas; J.D., Harvard Law School 1994. 1 would like to thank Veronica Thronson for her insights and
support in preparing this article.
i. See Castro v. United States, No. C-o6-6I, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 944o, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9,
2007).
2. See id.
3. See id. at "9-1o.
4. Id. at *io-ii.
5. Id. at *26 n.i i.
6. Transcript of Record at 3, Rodriguez v. Rico (Nev. Jud. Dist. Ct. Fam. Div. Oct. 15, 2003)
(No. D3o3o4) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
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of the undocumented children to their permanent resident father, the court
declared that:
One of the Court's reasons and rationale and logic behind its decision is
the fact-and neither counsel seem to disagree on that and, if anything,
they agreed [that] the designation of [father] as primary shortens the
immigration time [for the children] by as much as five years, if that was
my understanding. So that was tantamount in the Court's decision.'
In actuality, the agreed upon immigration analysis was nonsense, such that
a reviewing court found that "the district court improperly considered [the
father's] erroneous explanation of a repealed immigration statute."8
INTRODUCTION
Without analysis or rationale, federal decisions enforcing
immigration law routinely function as child custody determinations and
immigration issues prove influential or even determinative in state court
rulings on child custody. The custody of many children and the
composition of many families are profoundly influenced by the
unexamined convergence of immigration and family laws. Demographic
trends indicate these will not be isolated events and the need for deep
examination of the intersection of family law and immigration law is
growing precipitously.
As the number of immigrants and children of immigrants in the
United States grows,9 it is increasingly common to find "mixed-status"
families in which all family members do not share a single immigration or
citizenship status. '" Today, one of every ten children now lives in a
mixed-status family." Millions of children in mixed-status families are
themselves U.S. citizens living with parents who are not, and, in a portion
of these families, with parents who are not authorized to remain in the
United States.'2 At the same time, approximately 1.8 million children live
7. Id. at 4.
8. Rico v. Rodriguez, 120 P.3d 812, 814 (Nev. 2005) (upholding disposition of the case on
unrelated grounds).
9. One in five children in the United States lives in an immigrant family, i.e. a family in which
one or more parent is an immigrant. See FEDERAL INTERAGENCY FORUM ON CHILD AND FAMILY
STATISTICS, AMERICA'S CHILDREN: KEY NATIONAL INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 58 (2O2), available at
http://www.childstats.gov/pdf/ac2oo2/aco2.pdf.
io. In fact, 85% of families with children and headed by a noncitizen are mixed-status families.
See MICHAEL E. FIX ET AL., IMMIGRATION STUDIES: THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANT FAMILIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 15 (2OOI), available at http:/I www.urban.orgfUploadedPDF/immig-integration.pdf.
II. Id.
12. More than three million U.S. citizen children in the United States live in approximately two
million families where at least one parent is not authorized to remain in the country. See JEFFREY S.
PASSEL. THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. 8
(2oo6), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf.
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in the United States without authorization, including some
undocumented children whose parents have legal immigration status or
U.S. citizenship. 3 Among various combinations of immigration and
citizenship status that make up this country's families, one is particularly
widespread: in 41% of mixed-status families, parents have different
citizenship statuses. 4 Differences in immigration status within families
and between parents can create difficulties in the best of times, but they
present special challenges when families break apart.
When parents in a child custody dispute do not share the same
immigration or citizenship status, it is not unusual for the parent holding
a status perceived as superior to attempt to highlight the status of the
other.'5 While parties and courts often reflexively assume there is legal
significance or advantage in the distinction, the logic of this presumed
relevance rarely is explained. Arguments by attorneys and pro se
litigants alike feature a troubling prevalence of innuendo and outright
bigotry.
Yet at other times, parties without legal immigration status seek to
raise concerns related to immigration concerns in family courts, asking
courts to accommodate realities related to their situations or to tailor
decisions to facilitate desired immigration outcomes. Because
immigration status is an influential force that shapes the life experiences
of many immigrants and immigrant families, the immigration status of
parents and children forms an understandably tempting area of inquiry
for family judges struggling to make difficult determinations about the
interests of children on the basis of family law's vague and indeterminate
criteria.
Only a handful of courts have published opinions that formally
endorse the consideration of immigration status in making child custody
determinations.'6  These decisions rely on conclusory statements
13. Id. Children constitute 16% of the unauthorized migrant population in the United States. See
id.; see also Javier C. Hernandez, Tiny Deportee? Girl, 5, Faces Immigration Hearing That Could
Separate Her from Her Family If She Is Ordered to Return to El Salvador, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7, 2007,
at B t, available at http://www.boston.com/news/locallarticles/2007/o7/o7/tinydeportee.
14. Valerie Leiter et al., Challenges to Children's Independent Citizenship: Immigration, Family,
and the State, 13 CHILDHOOD II, 17 (2006).
15. See David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the Experiences of
Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts. I I TEX. Hisp. J.L. & POL'v 45,53 (2005).
16. See, e.g., In re Cardosa Vidal, No. 6-497/05-1751, 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 1286, at *9 (Iowa Ct.
App. Nov. 16, 2006) (noting that "the district court indicated Ana's undocumented status 'complicates
the custody issue'): Rico v. Rodriguez, 120 P.3d 812, 818-19 (Nev. 2005) ("[T]he district court has the
discretion to consider a parent's immigration status to determine its derivative effects on the
children."): Florentino v. Woods (In re parentage of Florentino), No. 25966-4-11. 2002 Wash. App.
LEXIS I896, at *i9 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 9. 2002) ("[Tlhe trial court has the discretion to consider the
undocumented status of a parent as a factor in the overall determination of the best interest of the
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regarding the permissibility of inquiries into immigration status and
provide little guidance as to the motivations and parameters of such
consideration. The impulse to consider immigration status in many cases
is dubious at best.'7 Other courts have incorporated immigration status
considerations into decisions without open acknowledgement or
comment, leaving room to wonder if the court has acted from unstated
bias or misinformation. Regardless of the motivation for the
consideration of immigration issues in child custody matters, its
execution by family court judges unversed in immigration law can be
misdirected and mistaken." In short, courts have demonstrated
willingness to consider immigration status issues in child custody disputes
but have yet to articulate a rationale for whether this engagement is
proper and to develop a workable framework for competent analysis if it
is.
One reason this interrelationship has not received more attention is
that immigration law and family law traditionally are viewed as extreme
opposites on the spectrum of state and federal power. In the common
understanding of the allocation of power between state and federal
courts, it is routine to acknowledge the plenary nature of federal
authority regarding matters of immigration. 9 Likewise, the primacy of
the states in matters of family law has long been accepted." Federal
courts have long been quick to invoke the "domestic relations exception"
that "divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and
child custody decrees."" Touting this division, the Supreme Court
declared that the states "possess 'special proficiency' in the field of
child.").
17. See In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 831 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting the trial judge as stating that
he had a "problem" with father's immigration status).
is. See e.g., Rico, 120 P.3d at 814 (noting that trial court accepted "erroneous explanation of a
repealed immigration statute").
19. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (I953) ("[T]hat the formulation of [policies pertaining
to the entry of noncitizens and their right to remain here] is entrusted exclusively to Congress has
become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any
aspect of our government."); see also Kleindiest v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (I972) ("[P]lenary
congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly
established.").
20. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) ("One of the principal areas in
which this Court has customarily declined to intervene is the realm of domestic relations. Long ago we
observed that '[tihe whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States."' (quoting In re Burrus, 136
U.S. 586, 593 (189o))).
21. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992); see also In re Burrus, 136 U.S. at 596
("[T]he relations of the father and child are not matters governed by the laws of the United
States....").
[Vo1. 59:453
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domestic relations, including child custody."2
But simply repeating the mantra that federal law does not
encompass family law does not make it so. In a number of areas, there is
increasing recognition "that the axiom that family law belongs
exclusively within the state domain is both empirically untrue and
theoretically unsound."23 As they regulate family relationships and
determine rights between family members, "federal social security law,
employee benefit law, immigration law, tax law, Indian law, military law,
same-sex marriage law, child support law, adoption law, and family
violence and abuse law are also forms of family law."24 Scholarly
exploration of the ways in which federal law operates as family law is
emerging in a number of contexts. 5 In the context of immigration, recent
scholarship demonstrates the manner in which immigration law functions
as family law in the regulation of marriage. 6 An analysis of immigration
law as family law in the context of child custody is overdue.
In earlier writing, I identified patterns in the responses of family
courts when immigration status issues arise across a broad spectrum of
issues in family law 7 and examined the tensions between children's and
parents' rights in situations where immigration law reaches differing
conclusions about the legal rights of parents and children to remain in
the United States." To date, very little attention has been directed at the
use of immigration status in family court generally, and even less toward
the prevalent context of child custody determinations. 9 In this Article, I
22. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 310 0993) (quoting Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704); see also
Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 26o (3d Cir. 2005) ("These are all matters of state law, as no federal
courts or statutes grant child custody."); Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women,
Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1746 n.337 (1991) (describing line of
federal cases disclaiming power over child custody).
23. Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 255 (i999); see also
Kristin A. Collins, Federalism's Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and the Invention
of States' Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761, 1814 (20o5).
24. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 875 (2004).
25. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Dependency, Taxes, and Alternative Families, 5 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 267, 267-68 (2002) (describing federal tax law's impact on dependent children in non-traditional
families); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform's Marriage Cure as the
Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1647 (2005) (exploring federal welfare law's
promotion of marriage).
26. See generally Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 1625 (20o7); Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 641 (2O05).
27. See Thronson, supra note I5, at 45.
28. See David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6
NEV. L.J. I 165, 1189-1213 (2oo6).
29. See Kerry Abrams, Immigration Status and the Best Interests of the Child Standard, 14 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 87, 87-89 (2006). In fact, most scholarship related to children and immigration
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seek to explore in depth this area that has received only limited scholarly
focus.
Part I of this Article evaluates, from a family law perspective, the
propriety of immigration status considerations in the determination of
child custody. It cautions that consideration of immigration status per se
is discriminatory and irrelevant to the best interests of the child, yet
rejects a bright line prohibition on raising immigration concerns in child
custody matters in light of the persistent and pervasive collateral impact
of immigration status on some children and families. In suggesting
parameters for the cautious evaluation of immigration related matters on
a case-by-case basis, the analysis is attuned to the ways in which
immigration status influences the lives of many immigrants and
immigrant families in a variety of predictable and unpredictable ways. In
particular, it considers the frequent contention that the determination of
child custody itself will play a critical role in the child's own immigration
or nationality status.
With evaluation of this potential interplay of child custody and a
child's immigration status in mind, Part II of the Article turns to
immigration law. Only with an understanding of the actual impact of a
child custody determination in immigration law is it possible to evaluate
truly how immigration law might impact the best interests of the child in
a child custody dispute. This section therefore undertakes a deep analysis
of the erratic and unprincipled role of child custody in immigration and
nationality law. It examines how the interrelated immigration and
nationality laws exhibit a remarkable lack of consistency in the import of
child custody and reveals a haphazard and capricious framework that
devalues children.
Part III builds on the preceding family law and immigration law
analyses by exploring the notion of immigration law as family law and
family law as immigration law. Looking at immigration law as family law
provides a critical perspective to review its treatment of children and
child custody. Likewise, critiquing the manner in which family law can
function as immigration law provides fresh insights regarding the
addresses the plight of unaccompanied minors. See, e.g., Jacqueline Bhabha, "Not a Sack of Potatoes":
Moving and Removing Children Across Borders, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 197, 205 (2006); Jacqueline
Bhabha & Wendy Young, Not Adults in Miniature: Unaccompanied Child Asylum Seekers and the
New U.S. Guidelines, i1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 84 (1999); Gregory Zhong Tian Chen, Elian or Alien? The
Contradictions of Protecting Undocumented Children Under the Special Immigrant Juvenile Statute, 27
HAsrINGS CONSr. L.Q. 597, 6oo (2ooo); Angela Lloyd, Regulating Consent: Protecting Undocumented
Immigrant Children from Their (Evil) Step-Uncle Sam, or How to Ameliorate the Impact of the 1997
Amendments to the SIl Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 237 (2006); Christopher Nugent, Whose Children
Are These? Towards Ensuring the Best Interests and Empowerment of Unaccompanied Alien Children,
15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219 (2006).
[Vo1. 59:453
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appropriate parameters for the consideration of immigration-related
issues in child custody matters. This analysis provides unique
perspectives from which to explore the significant tensions, and
occasional common ground, between the conflicting values and
contradictory policies of immigration law and family law.
I. CONSIDERING IMMIGRATION STATUS IN CHILD CUSTODY
DETERMINATIONS-MAINTAINING THE CENTRALITY OF CHILDREN'S
INTERESTS
Almost universally, "nations are guided by the precept that the
primary consideration underlying any [child] custody decision must be
the best interests of the child."30 Certainly, in the domestic context the
"custody law in every state in the United States... embraces the 'best
interests' standard."3' Courts emphasize that
custody determinations subordinate a parent's interests and allocate
custody according to a determination of the best interests of the child,
that the welfare of the child is the determining factor in establishing
child custody, that whatever claim parents may make for either custody
or visitation rights, is to be tested by what is in the best interest of the
child."
This approach places children and their interests at the center of the
matter.33
Still, "best interests" can take on many meanings. Some states make
no statutory attempt to clarify its meaning while others provide specific
criteria or guidelines for determining a child's best interest.34 Across the
board, however, family courts characteristically exercise tremendous
latitude in the application of this expansive standard.35 As one court put
30. D. Marianne Blair & Merle H. Weiner, Resolving Parental Custody Disputes-A Comparative
Exploration, 39 FAM. L.Q. 247, 247 (2005).
31. Id.
32. Hasday, supra note 24, at 849 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
33. See generally Mary Ann Mason, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE
HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES I (1994).
34. See Katherine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALl Principles
of the Law of Family Dissolution, 1o VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 5, 16 (2002).
35. See Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1238 (Alaska 1979) ("A court's task in a child custody
case is to determine which parent will better serve the best interests of the child. Myriad factors may
be considered in working toward this goal. To hold that a court may not consider religious factors
under any circumstances would blind courts to important elements bearing on the best interests of the
child. The constitution is not so inflexible as to foreclose all inquiry into this sensitive area."); Linda D.
Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Parentage and Assisted Reproduction
Problems Take Center Stage, 39 FAM. L.Q., 879, 894 (2oo6) ("Louisiana finds that the trial court is not
bound to make a mechanical evaluation of all statutory factors or to give more weight to one factor
over another; the factors are not exclusive." (citing In re Ricard, 906 So. 2d 544 (La. Ct. App. 2005)));
Robert D. Zalsow, Child Custody, Visitation, and the HIV Virus: Revisiting the Best Interests Doctrine
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it: "The family court 'may draw upon its own common sense and
experience in reaching a reasoned judgment' as to the best interests of
the child. '' 6 This equitable flexibility in the exercise of broadly stated
mandates stands in stark contrast to the unyielding application of a rigid
statutory framework in immigration law.
The flexibility of family court judges may be near its zenith in the
context of child custody disputes between parents. While parents have
interests of constitutional dimension in their relationships with their
children that limit the state's ability to intervene in families,37 in disputes
between parents it is not unusual for judges to interpret the presence of
strong constitutional interests on the part of both parents as license to
exercise particularly unfettered discretion. As one court articulated its
reasoning, where "both parents seek custody, each parent proceeds in
possession, so to speak, of a constitutionally-protected fundamental
parental right. Neither parent has a superior claim to the exercise of this
right to provide care, custody, and control of the children.""3 In this view,
"each fit parent's constitutional right neutralizes the other parent's
constitutional right, leaving, generally, the best interests of the child as
the sole standard to apply to these types of custody decisions."39
It is precisely in such custody disputes, with the perceived absence of
a confining structure of constitutional interests, that family courts are
most prone to grasp at imagined and real distinctions between parents,
including distinctions related to the immigration status of parents and
children. Whether this practice of permitting the broad reach of the
family court to include immigration status is appropriate turns in large
part on the purpose for which immigration status is considered and how
to Ensure Impartial Parental Rights Determinations for HIV-Infected Parents, 3 J. PHARMACY & L. 6I, 68
(994) ("Whether or not a particular jurisdiction has statutory guidelines upon which to determine a
child's best interests, all custody and visitation laws ... grant judges tremendous leeway to formulate a
decree as he/she may see fit.").
36. Osmanagic v. Osmanagic, 872 A.2d 897, 899 (Vt. 2005) (quoting Payrits v. Payrits, 757 A.2d
469,472 (2000)).
37. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (i944) (finding that it is "cardinal ... that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents"). In fact, "the interest of parents in
the care, custody, and control of their children .. .is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized" by the Supreme Court. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
38. McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 751, 770 (Md. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Baker v. Baker, 682 N.E.2d 661, 664 (Ohio Ct. App. 5996)
("Since both parents have a 'right' to custody, those conflicting rights cancel each other out, and the
best interest of the child is determinative."); Peterson v. Ransome, 8 Phila. Cty. Rptr. 461, 49o-91 (Pa.
Ct. Com. P1. 1983) ("In approaching the delicate question of child custody, the burden of proof
between natural parents is generally equal.... Given the equal standing of the parties, our analysis
shifts to the standard for determining custody matters. The polestar in deciding all custody and
visitation cases is the best interests and welfare of the child." (citation omitted)).
[Vol. 59:453
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it is utilized.
Several years ago, I conducted a systemic review of family court
decisions and described four approaches that family courts adopt when
considering immigration related issues.4' These patterns emerged across a
range of underlying family law issues and bridged jurisdictions.4 The first
approach is explicit discrimination, where courts and parties openly
indicate bias or where outcomes turn on immigration status per se.42
Second, and closely related, some family courts less convinced of the
propriety consideration of immigration status adopt the approach of
obfuscation.43 In such instances, courts articulate reasons purportedly
unrelated to immigration status in reaching decisions, but in actuality
their rationales are a pretext for immigration status considerations. 44
Third, many courts choose or feel forced into accommodation,
responding to the unavoidable collateral consequences and challenges
that sometimes accompany a party's immigration status.45 Finally some
courts employ a utilitarian approach of manipulation, or tailoring family
court outcomes in an effort to facilitate particular immigration
46outcomes .6
Mapping the possible use of immigration considerations in child
custody matters onto this framework proves a useful method to evaluate
the appropriateness of such consideration.
A. DISCRIMINATION AND OBFUSCATION-RESISTING A SHIFT AWAY FROM
CHILDREN'S INTERESTS
Immigrants are routinely fearful that their immigration status will
result in unfair treatment in child custody proceedings. The notion that
the flexibility of the best interests of the child standard can become a
vehicle for discrimination is not unique to immigrants and is shared by
parents and children from a variety of vulnerable populations.47 As anti-
4o. See Thronson, supra note 15, at 53.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 54-6o.
43. Id. at 64-68.
44. Id.
45. ld. at 68-71.
46. Id. at 60-64.
47. See, e.g.. Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and
Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REv. 577, 6o8 0997) (discussing how the best interest
standard's subjectivity and indeterminacy disproportionately impacts poor families and families of
color): Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay
and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 318 (1998) (discussing criticism that the best interests
standard "can mask all manner of biases, views, political interest, misconceptions, and . . . plain
ignorance" (quoting Judith G. Fowler, Homosexual Parents: Implications for Custody Cases, 33 FAM. &
CONCILIATION Crs. REV. 361, 362 (1995))); Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody
February 2008]
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immigrant ordinances and failed attempts at comprehensive immigration
reform make headlines, a strong societal narrative that immigrants are
undeserving and unworthy prevails. 4S Indeed, loud voices call expressly
for worse treatment of immigrants in their daily interactions with the
world, spouting a cynical and farfetched belief that rather than reforming
or enforcing immigration law, the United States can induce mass self-
deportation by imposing misery on immigrant families.49 In mixed-status
families, the societal marginalization of unauthorized immigrants has
serious spillover repercussions for other family members, without regard
to their individual immigration or citizenship status.0 Concerns of
judicial bias are exacerbated by unrestrained calls for outright
discrimination from opposing parties in child custody matters. Given this
pervasive social narrative and the reality of formal and informal
marginalization, it is not surprising that discrimination against
immigrants in the courtroom is widely anticipated.
Some courts confirm these fears by openly expressing discrimination
on the basis of immigration status5' or through more subtle or
unconscious bias against immigrants. 2 The struggles of immigrants in
Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 656 (2006) (discussing vagueness of best interests of the
child standard in context of the First Amendment and unpopular speech); Zalsow, supra note 35, at 68
(discussing "fear that judges may abuse the tremendous leeway to sculpt custody determinations in
line with their personal views, idiosyncrasies, and prejudices").
48. See, e.g., BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND IMMIGRATION
POLICY 2 (2o06) ("Unfortunately, the heartless side of U.S. immigration policy is on full display today;
anti-immigrant fervor has been quite effective of late.... The anti-immigrant movement in the United
States is as strong as ever. Immigrant bashing is popular among politicians, talk radio hosts, private
militiamen, and xenophobic grassroots organizations.").
49. See, e.g., Mark Krikorian, Immigration Problem Needs an Attrition Policy, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Aug. 28, 2005, http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepubfic/viewpoints/articles/o828krikoriano828online.
html ("This would involve both conventional measures, like arresting and deporting more illegals. But
an attrition strategy would also involve other measures-firewalls, you might say-to make it as
difficult as possible for illegal aliens to live a normal life here. This would entice fewer to come in the
first place and persuade millions who are already here to give up and deport themselves.... Over a
period of several years, such an attrition strategy would serve to shrink the illegal population to a
manageable nuisance ....").
50. See MICHAEL E. FIX & WENDY ZIMMERMAN, ALL UNDER ONE ROOF: MIXED-STATUS FAMILIES
IN AN ERA OF REFORM 2 (1999); Randy Capps et al., A Profile of Low-Income Working Immigrant
Families, in NEW FEDERALISM: NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICA'S FAMILIES, at 2 (The Urban Inst. Series
B., No. B-67, 2005); David B. Thronson, You Can't Get Here from Here: Toward a More Child-
Centered Immigration Law, 14 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 58, 77-80 (2006).
51. Cf. Leslye Orloff et al., Countering Abuser's Attempts to Raise Immigration Status of the
Victim in Custody Cases, in BREAKING BARRIERS: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESOURCES
FOR BATTERED IMMIGRANTS ch. 6.1, at I (2004), available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/
DocServer/counteringabuserattempts.pdf?doclD=289 ("Some judges may have strong negative
feelings about immigrants that will greatly influence their decision-making.").
52. Thronson, supra note 15, at 67 ("Family courts routinely set conditions that parties must meet
before the court makes decisions regarding child custody. . . .Occasionally, however, courts
[Vo1. 59:453
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high profile cases can reinforce fears and expectations of bias. 3
Unfortunately, the flexibility afforded judges under the best interests
standard "'mask[s] all manner of biases, views, political interest,
misconceptions and, indeed, plain ignorance. ' '54
Concerns regarding discrimination through the introduction of
immigration status in child custody matters have been raised most
prominently in the context of domestic violence. Domestic violence
advocates are acutely attuned to the issue because misinformation about
the role of immigration status in determining child custody usually begins
long before a court comes into the picture. Abusers can use "control over
immigration status to stop their spouses from reporting or fleeing from
the abuse ... by threatening deportation and loss of ability to work and
loss of child custody because of deportation."5 More pointedly, abusers
often convince victims that child custody proceedings would disfavor
parents without immigration authorization:
Fear of losing custody of or access to children is a significant factor that
keeps battered women from leaving their abusers or seeking help to
stop the abuse. This fear is substantiated by the fact that, in many child
custody cases, abusers of immigrant victims raise the issue of the
victims' lack of legal immigration status in order to tip the custody
scales in their favor. Abusers use child custody litigation as a vehicle to
maintain control over the victims.5
6
illegitimately use this routine device to mask the impact of immigration status on decisions by
attaching consequences to conditions that are based on wildly inaccurate assumptions about
immigration law and are impossible to meet.").
53. See Woody Baird, Girl, 8, Back with Chinese Parents, USA TODAY, July 23, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2007-07-23-27146oI73-x.htm ("A Chinese couple regained
legal custody of their 8-year-old daughter Monday after a seven-year fight to get her back from what
was supposed to by temporary foster care.").
54. Ball & Pea, supra note 47, (quoting Judith G. Fowler, Homosexual Parents: Implications for
Custody Cases, 33 FAM. & CONcLIATIONS CTs. REV. 361, 362 (1995)).
55. Janet Calvo, A Decade of Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: Coverture's Diminishment, but
Not Its Demise, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 153, 167-68 (2004); see also ORLOFF ET AL., supra note 51, at 6
("Threatening an immigrant victim that the police will turn her into USCIS if she calls the police for
help isolates the immigrant victim and her children from police and justice system protection and
shields the abuser from prosecution for his violence."); Linda Kelly, Stories from the Front: Seeking
Refuge for Battered Immigrants in the Violence Against Women Act, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 665,680 (1998)
("Abusive husbands routinely threaten to call INS and report their undocumented wives if there is any
attempt to report the beatings.").
56. ORLOFF ET AL., supra note 51, at 2 (footnotes omitted); see also Felicia E. Franco,
Unconditional Safety for Conditional Immigrant Women, i i BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 99, 136 (1996):
Margot Mendelson, The Legal Production of Identities: A Narrative Analysis of Conversations with
Battered Undocumented Women, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 138, 182 (2004) (describing interviews
with undocumented women in which they "all regarded the courts and the custody laws as adversarial
to their interests.... The women shared an overriding sense of their own vulnerability in the legal
setting").
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The stakes in child custody disputes are high and misinformation,
distrust, and fear of discrimination persist, despite immigration law
reforms that ameliorate aspects of an abuser's control in the immigration
system. 7 Indeed, "48.2% of battered immigrant women who reported
still living in an abusive relationship cited the fear of losing child custody
as an obstacle to leaving that relationship. '' 8 This means that "many
battered immigrant mothers are reluctant to pursue a civil order of
protection, divorce, custody, or child support proceeding .... Since their
mothers are legally incapacitated, these children lose their natural
advocates."5 9 In this milieu, even before arriving in court, fear of
discrimination in the determination of child custody creates a strong
barrier to battered women and children accessing the justice system.
In response to this situation, advocates for immigrant domestic
violence victims have long advanced strong opposition to the
consideration of immigration status in child custody disputes. One
American Bar Association publication flatly concluded that "parties
should not be able to raise, and courts should not consider, immigration
status of domestic violence victims and their children in civil protection
order, custody, divorce or child support proceedings. " 60 Such a bright line
articulation is a lucid reaction to the familiar misuse of immigration
status by abusers.
Of course, the reason to resist the introduction of immigration status
considerations in child custody matters cannot be that the feared
discriminatory use of immigration status is appropriate and has merit.
Implicit in the desire of abusers to raise immigration status issues is the
57. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § tt54(a)(i)(A)(iii), (B)(iii) (2000) (detailing provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act under which spouses and children who have been battered or subjected to
extreme cruelty may qualify to "self-petition"); see also id. § Iioi(a)(i5)(U) (2000) (providing the
possibility of visas to those who suffer substantial physical and mental abuse as the result of certain
crimes). Moreover,
in no case may the Attorney General, or any other official or employee of the
[government] ... make an adverse determination of admissibility or deportability of an
alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act using information furnished solely by ... a
spouse or parent who has battered the alien or subjected the alien to extreme cruelty.
Id. § 1367(a)(1)(A) (2o00).
58. ORLOFF ET AL., supra note 51, at 7; accord Franco, supra note 56, at 135-36 (concluding that
"[m]any immigrant women remain in physically and/or psychologically abusive relationships because
they fear that leaving their husbands will mean losing their children").
59. Franco, supra note 56, at 137.
6o. HOWARD DAVIDSON, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON
CHILDREN, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 20 (1994); accord ORLOFF
ET AL., supra note 5 I, at s (noting that a "non-abusive parent's immigration status should not be raised
nor should it be considered pertinent in custody, protection order, divorce, or other family law
proceedings").
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"claim[] that it is better for children to live with an abusive person rather
than with a non-abusive parent who may lack legal immigration status or
permanent legal immigration status. ' '6' Even in the absence of domestic
violence, those seeking to introduce immigration status into child custody
proceedings often expect that some real or perceived difference in
immigration status, standing alone, can and should provide advantage in the
indeterminate child custody calculus. 6' There often may be good reason to
confront parties and courts that openly or tacitly accept this premise.
Complete avoidance of the issue of immigration status in family
court may allow the persistence of the misinformation and fear that
keeps immigrants away from courts designed to protect their interests.
Parties are certain to ask courts to discriminate, and in a world where
immigrants and those around them are uncertain of their rights, it is
worth articulating reasons that discrimination based on immigration
status must be rejected. At times, open engagement on the merits is the
best way to keep a court from obfuscating its unexamined discriminatory
assumptions and conclusions.
Though "nobody argues that aliens are treated identically with
citizens in every circumstance,"'63 popular conceptions that parents
without authorized immigration status have lesser interests in the parent-
child relationship 64 are simply false. The rare courts that have actually
commented on whether immigration status per se might validly impact
child custody have rejected the notion, tersely yet unequivocally.
Dismissing in a footnote the argument that a father "should be denied
custody solely because of his immigration status," an appellate court in
Washington observed that "[t]he due process and equal protection
provisions prevent denying an illegal immigrant custody based on that
ground." 6' Persons who knowingly "enter this country without legal
6I. ORLOFF ET AL., supra note 51, at 5.
62. See, e.g., Florentino v. Woods (In re parentage of Florentino), No. 25966-4-Il, 2002 Wash.
App. LEXIS 1896, at *17 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2002) (noting that in appeal mother assigned error
to the trial court's "failure to in any way consider the fact that the Respondent father is not a U.S.
citizen and is not a legal permanent resident of the United States").
63. Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1047, IO63 (994). In the United States, the law is "deeply divided about the significance of the
status of alienage for the allocation of rights and benefits in our society." Id. at 1055.
64. See John Brummett, Can't We All Meet at the Southern Border?, PAHRUMP VALLEY TIMES,
Mar. 3 , 2006, http://www.pahrumpvalleytimes.com/2oo6/o31 /opinion/brummett.html ("We'll put the
illegal parents in the van bound for Mexico and the American kids in the van bound for the social
services agencies.").
65. Florentino, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 1896, at *i8 n.i i; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210
(1982) (recognizing that "even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been
recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments");
Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 654 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[P]arents have a fundamental liberty
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authorization are not stripped immediately of all their rights because of
this single illegal act." 6
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that
among the "fundamental interests [that] apply to individuals regardless
of their immigration status" is "the interest of parents in the care,
custody, and control of their children."' As such, without regard to their
immigration status, parents stand "on equal footing . . . when asserting
their right to custody of their children." 68
Certainly trepidation about and vigilance for discrimination in child
custody disputes on the basis of immigration status is prudent, but
hesitation to inject immigration status issues must never arise from any
sense of ambiguity that a parent or child's rights regarding custody might
be diminished merely on the basis of their immigration status.69 A
parent's immigration or citizenship status per se is irrelevant to the
determination of a child's best interests because it says absolutely
nothing about the parenting of any person or rights of that person in the
parent-child relationship.
Indeed, any conclusions related to parenting, character, or a child's
best interests made on the basis of a parent's failure to emerge at a
particular exit from the daunting maze that is U.S. immigration law
would be misplaced. Commonly advanced comparisons of past
generations of "legal" immigrants with immigrants currently lacking
authorization are tenuous given the proliferation of barriers to legalizing
status that simply did not exist for previous cohorts."° Intergenerational
interest in maintaining a relationship with their children which is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
66. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 498 (M.D. Pa. 2007). The court further
noted:
[T]he contemporary concern with and opprobrium towards undocumented aliens does not
lead us to the conclusion that those who violate the laws to enter the United States can be
subject without protest to any procedure or legislation, no matter how violative of the rights
to which those persons would normally be entitled as persons in the United States.
Id. at 499 n.9.
67. Rico v. Rodriguez, 120 P.3d 812, 818 (Nev. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (noting that "the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control
of their children ... is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests"); Lassiter v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (t98t) ("This Court's decisions have by now made plain beyond the need
for multiple citation that a parent's desire for and right to 'the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his or her children' is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants deference."'
(quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,651 (1972))).
68. Rico, 120 P.3d at 818.
69. See Thronson, supra note I5, at 59-62.
70. See Mae M. Ngai, How Grandma Got Legal, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2oo6, at B13 (noting that
"[t]he government excluded a mere i % of the 25 million immigrants who landed at Ellis Island before
World War I, mostly for health reasons" and that the "Chinese were the exception, excluded on
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comparisons often are not only misguided but also misinformed.7' Of
those who successfully navigate the current law to become permanent
residents, almost one-third lived without authorization in the United
States at some point.72
Certainly immigration law itself does not find a lack of authorized
immigration status to be remotely indicative of either parenting ability or
moral character. For example, persons without authorized immigration
status who face removal from the United States may seek a form of relief
in immigration court known as cancellation of removal.73 This requires
them to prove, among other things, that they have simultaneously "been
physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less
than io years"74 and have "been a person of good moral character during
[that] period."75 In fiscal year 2006, 3,672 persons were granted
cancellation of removal: each of these persons necessarily established
that their unauthorized immigration status was consistent with a positive
determination of good moral character. 76 The absence of authorized
immigration status is not intended as a measure of a person's character.
For another example, the government routinely facilitates the
removal of children, including U.S.-citizen children, together with
parents who face removal from the United States pursuant to
immigration law. Throughout the removal process, parents are charged
with making critical decisions about the care and custody of their
children. Indeed, Board of Immigration Appeals case law explicitly
presumes that parents removed from the United States will continue as
their caretakers after removal.77 Thus even when immigration law has
grounds of 'racial unassimilability"').
71. See Brian Donohue, Many Immigrants Were Legal Only Because There Were No Rules, STAR-
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July 22, 2007, at I (noting that "if everyone's grandparents said they
immigrated legally, someone's grandparents were lying" and that government statistics showed 1.4
million unauthorized immigrants in 1925 when numerical restrictions on immigration were relatively
new).
72. MICHAEL E. Fix & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANTS: SETTING THE RECORD
STRAIGHT 21 (1994); see also Lenni B. Benson, The Invisible Worker, 27 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
483, 484 (2002) (noting that given the complexities of immigration law, it is not unusual that even the
immigrant herself does not fully understand her immigration status and applicable protections from
removal).
73. See 8 U.S.C. § I229b(b) (2000).
74. Id. § 122 9b(b)(i)(A).
75. Id. § 1229b(b)(i)(B).
76. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2006 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, at R3 tbl.i5 (2007) [hereinafter YEARBOOK],
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fyo6syb.pdf.
77. See In re Ige, 20 I. & N. Dec. 88o, 885 (B.I.A. 1994) ("The claim that the child will remain in
the United States can easily be made for purposes of litigation, but most parents would not carry out
such an alleged plan in reality. Therefore we will require, at a minimum, an affidavit from the parent
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reached its harshest judgment and imposed removal from the United
States, immigration law provides no indication that a parent's
relationship to his or her child warrants any less respect due to lack of
immigration status. 8
Ostensibly, "a custody decree is not meant to punish a parent, or
anyone else; its only purpose is to help the children."79 Placing weight on
a parent's immigration status per se improperly moves the focus of child
custody proceedings away from the best interests of the child. Parental
rights are not affected by immigration status; neither are children's
interests. A child has no less interest in maintaining a relationship with a
parent on the basis of the parent's immigration status. Any attempt to
argue that immigration status alone is relevant to the best interests of the
child should be rejected out of hand as discriminatory and irrelevant.
A bright line prohibition against any consideration of immigration
status in child custody proceedings would stand as a firewall against
discrimination and the intimidation inherent in parties' attempts to raise
immigration status matters. This does not necessarily mean, however,
that the call for an absolute bar on the consideration of immigration
status is the answer. While a strict prohibition on any mention of
immigration status admittedly has appeal as one way of avoiding
discrimination, it has significant downsides as well. One of these is the
possibility that discrimination is simply converted to obfuscation.
Another is that, quite apart from impermissible bias, immigration status
does sometimes have real and tangible impacts on the lives of children.
B. ACCOMMODATION-ADDRESSING THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN
IMMIGRATION STATUS AND EVERYDAY REALITY
A strict prohibition on raising immigration status issues in child
custody matters would be difficult to maintain because immigration
status does have an impact on the experiences of many immigrants and
their families. This is especially true for mixed-status families that face
or parents stating that it is their intention that the child remain in this country, accompanied by
evidence demonstrating that reasonable provisions will be made for the child's care and support (such
as staying with a relative or in a boarding school).").
78. See Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1158 (3d Cir. 1977) (determining that parents can
decide where the child will live after parents' deportation and assuming that parents generally will
decide to keep their children with them); see also Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447, 451 (1995) ("In order
to economize on its limited resources, the INS usually does not bother to institute a formal
deportation proceeding against an alien who is likely to depart anyway, such as the minor child of
parents who are being deported.").
79. In re Custody of Temos, 450 A.2d III, 125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); see also Gaskill v. Gaskill,
936 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) ("Custody should never be used to punish or reward the
parents ... ").
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daily conundrums as they interface with societal institutions unsure of
the implications associated with the array of statuses that such families
present. The influence of immigration status in shaping daily life can be
logistical and practical, or it can be much more significant. In some cases,
the influence of immigration status is vitally relevant to the
determination of a child's interests.
For example, as discussed above, immigration status can play a
central role in establishing and perpetuating dynamics of family violence.
In such instances, ignoring the power and influence of immigration status
may be among the least appropriate choices. Any examination of
families where immigration status is a strong negative force would be
incomplete and misleading without reference to concerns related to
immigration. Indeed, the very same American Bar Association report
that calls for an absolute prohibition on raising immigration status in
family court also notes that
[o]ffering battered immigrant parents and their children a way out of
violent homes requires that attorneys, judges, police, child protective
service workers and advocates develop an understanding of immigrant
parents' life experience, so that they may craft legal relief that will be
effective in stopping violence while being respectful of their cultural
experiences.8
It is important for family judges to realize that "[i]n many instances,
the fact that battered immigrant women have no legal immigration status
or documentation in the U.S. is a result of the batterer's use of the
victim's immigration status as a weapon of abuse.",8, Moreover, it may
well be the case that in some instances "[a]n abuser's attempt to raise the
other parent's immigration status... [itself] is evidence of on-going
abuse."'" If this is the case, a court's inquiry into the abuser's motives and
rationale for attempting to inject the issue of immigration status into the
proceeding may be especially telling. Further, the strategic decision of a
party or attorney in a particular case to educate a judge regarding the
true impact of immigration status ought to not be prohibited or even
discouraged.8 In such instances it may well be a person lacking
8o. DAVIDSON, supra note 6o, at 19.
8i. Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women's Willingness to Call for Help and Police
Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 43,55 (2003).
82. ORLOFF ET AL., supra note 51 , at 6; see also Topo v. Dhir, 21o F.R.D. 76, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
("Courts have generally recognized the in terrorem effect of inquiring into a party's immigration status
when irrelevant to any material claim.").
83. See Orloff, supra note 8i, at 46 ("The pervasive lack of understanding of the life experiences
of battered immigrant women by the systems designed to protect battered women and immigrant
victims greatly reduces the likelihood that immigrant victims will be able to escape the violence in
their lives.").
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immigration authorization who seeks to bring immigration concerns that
are highly relevant to the child's best interests to the court's attention.
The appropriate line in child custody matters cannot be, or at least
cannot always be, drawn to enforce absolute silence about immigration
status. This conclusion extends outside the realm of domestic violence, as
immigration status unquestionably influences the lives of many
immigrants and immigrant families in a variety of predictable and
unpredictable ways. To argue that concerns related to immigration never
impact the interests of children in any situation is not credible, and it is
unrealistic to think that judges will or should completely ignore the
persistent and pervasive collateral impact of immigration status on some
children and families. Practically significant examples include
establishing levels of child support or enforcing child support when
parties are not unauthorized to work."' Eligibility restrictions for
important benefits, such as Supplemental Security Income, food stamps,
and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families may be highly relevant to
some families."' If an affidavit of support is executed in support of an
immigration application, this may have relevance to support issues.""
It is important, however, to articulate limits on the court's
consideration of immigration concerns to prevent the introduction of
irrelevant stereotypes. For example, claims related to the insecurity and
precariousness of immigrants' continuing presence in the United States
are easily overstated."' Millions of immigrants, without regard to
immigration status, have regular employment and established homes in
the United States. As the Supreme Court has remarked, the presence of
a population lacking authorized immigration status in the United States
is quite established. 8 Even with occasional spikes in the enforcement of
immigration laws, most unauthorized immigrants are unlikely to face
84. See Thronson, supra note 15, at 70.
85. See In re Kittridge, 714 N.Y.S.2d 653, 654 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 200o); see also NATIONAL IMMIGRANT
LAW CENTER, IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK, IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR PUBLIC
BENEFITS 759 (2005--06 ed.), available at http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/special/imm-elig__for-pub-bens_
aila 03o5.pdf.
86. See 8 U.S.C. § 1 82(a)(4)(C) (2000) (requiring affidavits of support in the context of family-
sponsored immigration); Abrams. Immigration Law, supra note 26, at I7OO-O 7 (discussing
enforceability of affidavits of support in the context of immigration based on marriage).
87. See In re Margarita T., No. A-95-53o, 1995 Neb. App. LEXIS 397, at *6 (Neb. Ct. App. Dec.
19,1995).
88. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-i9 (1982) (commenting on "the creation of a substantial
'shadow population' of illegal migrants-numbering in the millions-within our borders" which
"raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to
remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes
available to citizens and lawful residents").
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removal."' Even those in removal proceedings may be eligible for relief,
such that "a State cannot realistically determine that any particular
undocumented [person] will in fact be deported until after deportation
proceedings have been completed."' Immigrants in removal proceedings
are entitled to due process protections that provide time from the
initiation of proceedings to avenues of appeal to possible removal.' In
sum, a person's presence in the United States without authorized
immigration status is not in and of itself evidence of instability.
Similarly, many immigrants may face economic challenges and
insecurities that impact their children's interests; mixed-status families
"are more likely to be poor than other families."92 "Children in low-
income working immigrant families were more than twice as likely as
those in comparable native families to lack health insurance coverage in
2oo2" 93 and children of immigrants are "significantly less likely to be in
any regular nonparental child care arrangement. '" 94 The list could go on,
but general statistics are irrelevant to child custody decisions.
It is well established that "child custody disputes, by their very
nature, must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis."95 Stereotypes and
statistics are ill equipped to replace case-by-case inquiries about the lives
of children required under the best interests standard. Millions of
immigrants, with and without authorization, have unique experiences of
life in the United States. Constant vigilance is required to combat
89. In fiscal year 2006, 220,057 persons were ordered removed by immigration judges. See
YEARBOOK, supra note 76, at D2. This represents just 1.8% of the estimated twelve million
unauthorized immigrants in the United States. See MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., ESTIMATES OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2006, at 1 (2oo7),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ill-pe-2oo6.pdf. Given the
immigration enforcement focus on criminal noncitizens, the noncriminal immigrant faces a remarkably
low probability of formal removal. In fact, for some demographic groups, statistical probability of
removal generally is well less than the probability of incarceration for a crime. See Abrams,
Immigration Status, supra note 29, at 9.
9o .Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226.
91. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 2o6, 212 0953) (noting that persons
"who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings
conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law").
92. Fix, supra note 5o.
93. Capps et al., supra note 5o, at 4.
94. Id. at 5.
95. John A. v. Bridget M.. 791 N.Y.S.2d 421, 429 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); see also Hicks v. Hicks,
868 A.2d 1245, 1247-48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) ("It is well-established ... that custody and visitation
matters are to be decided on the basis of the judicially determined 'best interests of the child' standard,
on a case-by-case basis, considering all factors which legitimately have an effect upon the child's
physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well-being." (citation omitted)); see also Rico v. Rodriguez,
120 P.3d 812, 817 (Nev. 2005) ("Child custody determinations are by necessity made on a case-by-case
basis.").
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attempts to essentialize their experiences and replace individualized fact
finding with assumption and stereotypes.
As such, a critical limit must be placed on the consideration of
immigration concerns in child custody, restricting such consideration to
instances where immigration concerns are demonstrably relevant on an
individualized basis to the best interests of the child. The proponent of
considering immigration status or concerns must have the burden of
establishing specific facts and their relevance to the best interests of the
child. Forcing the proponent to articulate a rationale for the
consideration of immigration status brings transparency to the best
interest determination and reduces opportunities for discrimination and
obfuscation. At the same time, this approach maintains flexibility in
responding to the myriad unseen ways in which immigration law impacts
lives.96 It may well be that attempts to inject immigration-related
concerns into child custody matters will rarely succeed, but the rejection
of irrelevant bias based on immigration status per se does not preclude
carefully delineated factual analysis of the collateral consequences of the
workings of immigration law on children.
Opening the door to considering the collateral consequences of
immigration status creates a tremendous challenge for immigrants and
their advocates to combat stereotypes and assumptions, lest
discrimination simply take the guise of fact-finding. This approach,
however, is in accord with a growing consensus that the potential
complications of immigration law in the lives of children and families
must be acknowledged, understood, and, when appropriate, affirmatively
addressed in legal representation.97
C. MANIPULATION-KEEPING PERSPECTIVE AND GET'rING IT RIGHT
All persons working in family courts "need to understand certain
aspects of immigration law simply because in the process of conducting
normal business they may unknowingly make decisions with far-reaching
immigration consequences."" Understanding the impact that will result is
96. The unpredictability of immigration law's impact in the lives of children and families makes a
more rigid barrier to use of immigration status less appealing. But see Abrams, supra note 29, at 98
(proposing "a presumption that immigration status is not relevant in child custody disputes, coupled
with specific classes of cases in which the presumption could be rebutted").
97. See, e.g., Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on Representing Children in Families:
Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham, 6 Nev. L.J. 592, 597 (2oo6) ("In juvenile justice
and child welfare proceedings, children's attorneys should understand the interconnections to other
related substantive areas, such as health, housing, public benefits, education, domestic violence,
immigration, and transnational issues ... ").
98. KATHERINE BRADY & SALLY KINOSHITA, IMMIGRATION BENCHBOOK FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY
COURT JUDGES 2 (2OO5), available at www.ilrc.org/resources/sijs/2oo5 % 20SIJS% 2obenchbook.pdf.
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one thing, yet consciously adjusting family law determinations to tailor
immigration impact is a step further. A final approach by which parties
and courts inject considerations of immigration status into child custody
matters is by manipulating proceedings and outcomes to facilitate
particular immigration outcomes. Requests for the court to consider
immigration status for such a purpose frequently originate with or on
behalf of persons lacking immigration status. For example, because an
adoption finalized after a child reaches the age of sixteen is not
recognized for immigration purposes,' expediting an adoption
proceeding may be in the best interests of the child. In such instances, an
open request for the court to consider immigration status in the
proceeding often is made. The requested manipulation only remotely
implicates the rights of other parties and likely is unobjectionable.
Going further, one court decided that it was in the best interests of a
child to remain with his mother in the United States, where his father
also resided and a family support network existed, then it refused to
divorce the child's parents in favor of a legal separation with the hope
that it would entice the father to follow through with a petition necessary
for the mother to obtain legal immigration status. I" After determining
that it was in the child's best interests to remain with his mother in the
United States, the court logically concluded that it was in the child's
interest for his mother to obtain the immigration authorization that she
desired.'"' In attempting to facilitate this result, however, the court
impinged greatly on the father's right to divorce.' 2 In such a case,
manipulation is done "with sympathetic intent, but it can make outcomes
inconsistent, unpredictable and, at least from the perspective of some
parties, unfair."'0 3
In the case described at the outset of this Article, a family court
judge expressed concern that two undocumented children faced "too
many dangers.., specifically a threat of deportation or whatnot to have
the children continue to reside with [their undocumented mother]."' 4
The court was convinced by the father's attorney that naming the father
as primary custodian of the children would shorten the time for the
children to obtain legal immigration status "by as much as five years.' 0.5
99. See 8 U.S.C. § tioi(b)(i)(E) (20oo); see also infra note 161 and accompanying text.
too. See Velez v. Velez, No. 10-41-81, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3139, at *IO (Conn. Super. Ct.
Dec. 7, 1994).
Ioi. Id. at 6-7,9n.i.
102. See id. at iO.
103. David B. Thronson & Veronica Tobar Thronson, Immigrants and the Family Courts, NEV.
LAWYER, Jan. 2006, at 30.
104. See Transcript of Record, supra note 6, at 3.
105. Id. at 4.
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In fact, the legal authority relied upon for this proposition was a
citizenship statute that had been repealed three years earlier and which,
even when in effect, had no applicability to undocumented children who
were not yet permanent residents. 'O' In other words, the legal analysis
that "was tantamount in the Court's decision"" was fatally flawed. In
fact, the assignment of custody to the father made no difference in the
timing or range of options for the children to obtain immigration status.
These cases highlight several concerns that appear when courts
attempt to manipulate immigration results in the child custody context.
First, manipulation may fail to account for the rights of all parties.
Manipulation in favor of one may be benign or may discriminate against
another party. Second, judges may put unwarranted emphasis on the
importance of children obtaining legal immigration status or citizenship.
Actions that promote the acquisition of legal immigration status and
citizenship may be positive, but this is not universally true. Moreover,
achieving a different immigration or citizenship status is but one piece of
a larger puzzle. Trading daily contact with a mother for the sake of a
green card is a questionable proposition for most children. Third, it is
vital that family courts that attempt to engage in tailoring family court
rulings to facilitate immigration outcomes understand the relevant
immigration law. In the unforgiving world of immigration law,
manipulation gone wrong can be disastrous. Moreover, even if no harm
is caused on the immigration front, there is harm if a child custody
determination is warped by an inaccurate reading of immigration law.
Most family court judges and attorneys are not especially familiar with
immigration law, and it is easy for misunderstandings to arise. More is
needed than mere mechanical knowledge of how child custody might
influence immigration outcomes. If immigration law considerations are
to have any place in child custody proceedings, an exploration of the
nature and values expressed in immigration law's treatment of children
and child custody is in order. With these caveats in mind, the next section
of this Article provides an analysis of the role of child custody in
immigration and nationality law.
io6. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law Regarding Derivative of Citizenship of the Minor
Children at 2, Rodriguez v. Rico, No. 303041 (Nev. Jud. Dist. Ct. Fam. Div. July 17, 2003) (on file with
author); see Plaintiff's Pre-Trial Memorandum at 7-8, Rodriguez v. Rico, No. 303041 (Nev. Jud. Dist.
Ct. Fam. Div. Oct. 3, 2003) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1432 which was repealed by section 103(a) of the Child
Citizenship Act of 2ooo, Pub. L. No. io6-395, 114 Stat. 63) (on file with author).
107. See Transcript of Record, supra note 6, at 4.
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II. THE ERRATIC ROLE OF CHILD CUSTODY IN
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW
One of the more seemingly straightforward pitches for considering
immigration and citizenship status that parties in child custody disputes
advance is that the assignment of custody to one parent will influence or
determine the children's immigration or citizenship status. This section
sets out a thorough analysis of the erratic role of child custody in
immigration and nationality law. Only when a court understands the
impact of a child custody determination in immigration law can it
evaluate how immigration law might impact the best interests of the child
determination in a child custody dispute. Moreover, determining the
significance of child custody in immigration and nationality law requires
contextualization in the treatment of children more generally in these
frameworks. This examination of the role of child custody in immigration
and nationality law therefore also can serve to acquaint judges with the
nature and values of the immigration system that they often are asked to
take into account.
A. IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP DISTINGUISHED
Understanding the role of child custody in immigration law requires
a basic conception of the structure of U.S. immigration and nationality
laws, especially as the laws apply to children. First, it is important to
distinguish between immigration law and citizenship or nationality law.
While closely related, the distinction is important because the two areas
treat children distinctly. Indeed, the term "child" is even defined
differently for purposes of immigration law and citizenship law, and child
custody plays a distinct role in each context.'08
Immigration and nationality laws are set out in separate statutory
chapters of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Traditionally,
immigration law concerns which noncitizens" may be admitted to the
United States, how long they may remain, and the process by which
persons unable to remain are removed."' These provisions are set out in
io8. See 8 U.S.C. § i ioi(b)(i) (2000) (defining child for immigration purposes); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ iioI(c)(t) (2ooo) (defining child for nationality purposes).
io9. Immigration statutes refer to all noncitizens by the term "alien," defined as "any person not a
citizen or national of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § I ios(a)(3) (2ooo). The persistent use of "alien" as
a pejorative for the smaller population of persons lacking authorization to remain in the United States
blurs its more precise technical meaning as anyone not a U.S. citizen. See generally Kevin R. Johnson,
"Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 268 (997). In this Article I use the term "noncitizen" except in direct
quotation.
Iio. Immigration law defines "immigrant" in the negative as "every alien except an alien who is
within one of the following classes of nonimmigrant aliens." 8 U.S.C. § iioi(a)(t5) (2000) (setting
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Title II of the Immigration and Nationality Act."'
Immigration laws set forth a multitude of temporary visa statuses as
well as the status of lawful permanent resident."' Immigrants granted
permanent resident status presumptively are permitted to remain
indefinitely in the United States."3 Additionally, permanent residents
may work in the United States, ' 4 travel outside the country and return,"5
sponsor specified relatives for immigration status"6 and, in some
instances after statutory waiting periods that can last many years, receive
many forms of public benefits."7 Still, permanent residents are subject to
removal from the United States based upon commission of certain acts
designated by statutes. These statutes have been subject to frequent
modifications that, in some instances, are applied retroactively."8
Permanent residents also may abandon their status by leaving the United
States for too long a period."9 In addition to the uncertainties that can
accompany legal permanent resident status, noncitizens receive much
less favorable treatment under immigration laws in petitioning for their
relatives to receive immigration benefits. Permanent residents,
moreover, are not permitted the full voting and participation rights in the
political process that are available to U.S. citizens.
Title III of the Immigration and Nationality Act sets out the
statutory framework for becoming a U.S. citizen.' ° Becoming a U.S.
citizen is most commonly achieved through birth within the United
forth categories of nonimmigrant visas). Moreover, the law mandates that "[e]very alien ... shall be
presumed to be an immigrant until he establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer, at the time
of application for a visa, . . . that he is entitled to a nonimmigrant status under [8 U.S.C.
§ IIoi(a)(I5)]." 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) (2000). It is thus entirely accurate to use the term "immigrant" for
many noncitizens who lack legal authorization to remain in the United States.
iii. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1363a (2000).
112. This status is variously referred to as lawful permanent resident, legal permanent resident,
having a green card, LPR, and permanent resident. These variations in name and usage reflect no
difference in legal status and this article will adopt the term permanent resident.
113. See 8 U.S.C. § 1IS (2ooo). Some other forms of immigration relief are potentially of
indefinite duration, subject to other considerations such as shifting country conditions. See, e.g., 8
U.S.C. § 1158 (2ooo) (asylum); id. § 1231 (2000) (withholding of removal); 8 C.F.R. § 2o8.16 (2007)
(relief from removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture).
114. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(r)(B)(ii) (2000).
115. See id. § iiol(a)(13)(C).
116. See id. § 1154(a).
117. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of I996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, iso Stat. 2105 (1996) (introducing distinctions in the availability of public benefits
between citizens and legal permanent residents).
118. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2000) (setting out general "classifications of deportable aliens").
ii9. Id. § iioi(a)(i3)(C)(ii).
12o. See id. §§ 1401-1504.
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States, or jus soli citizenship. 2 ' Citizenship also is extended by statute to
persons not covered by the geographic reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment, such as children born abroad to a U.S. citizen parent who
meets certain other requirements.'" Persons not born with U.S.
citizenship may qualify to naturalize as citizens after obtaining and
holding permanent resident status for a requisite number of years and
meeting a host of other requirements.' 3 Finally, and importantly, under
certain circumstances children may "derive" U.S. citizenship from their
parent's naturalization or citizenship.'24
Generally, when a person is not a permanent resident, immigration
law is much more present than nationality law. For those who were not
born as U.S. citizens, the intermediate step of permanent residency,
however briefly held in the case of some children who derive citizenship,
is a necessary step on the path to becoming a citizen.' 5 For those granted
permanent residency, nationality law takes on new relevance in
regulating naturalization."'
With this framework of immigration and nationality laws in mind,
the role of child custody in each setting can be explored. As will be seen,
the related and sometimes interwoven laws of immigration and
nationality exhibit a striking lack of consistency in the treatment of
children and the importance of child custody. What emerges is not a
thoughtful and reasoned pattern but rather a haphazard scheme,
occasionally to the random benefit of children yet often capriciously
harmful.
B. CHILD CUSTODY IN PARENT-CENTERED IMMIGRATION LAW
In reviewing immigration law's treatment of children, child custody
is revealed as a bit player in support of the star: immigration law's
peculiar notion of the parent-child relationship. Even in its relatively
minor role, however, child custody is ever-present and takes on
121. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside."); see also infra note 235 and accompanying text.
122. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 14Ol, 1409 (2000); see also infra notes 242-43, 246-47, 250 and accompanying
text.
123. See 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (2000); see also infra note 255 and accompanying text.
124. See 8 U.S.C §§ 1431, 1433 (2000); see also infra notes 256, 258-59, 262, 284, 285 and
accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., 7 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 98.0313][f] (2006)
("A basic requirement for the transmission of derivative citizenship is that the child must become a
lawful permanent resident of the United States before attaining the prescribed age of maturity.").
126. One error in the legal analysis of the Rico v. Rodriguez case discussed above was putting the
cart ahead of the horse in turning to nationality law for children who were not yet permanent
residents. See discussion supra at note 67 and accompanying text.
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undeniable and, in some instances, indefensible importance. The
discussion below explains how the parent-child role mediates children's
access to immigration benefits and then describes the curious role of
child custody in processes by which immigration law recognizes a parent-
child relationship.
i. The Right Parent- The Central Role of the Parent-Child
Relationship in Immigration Law
The parent-child relationship is central to children's access to the
three primary avenues for permanent immigration to the United States:
family-sponsored immigration, employment-based immigration, and
diversity immigration.'27 Though other provisions make immigration
relief available to smaller numbers in response to particular situations,
such as provisions that prohibit the return of persons to countries where
they would face torture'2 or where they have a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of specified grounds,' 9 the above three primary
avenues encompass the vast bulk of legal immigration.
Of the three primary avenues, family-sponsored immigration is
directly responsible for the largest portion of legal immigration,
accounting for 63% of legal immigration in fiscal year 2006. '3o Under the
family-sponsored immigration scheme, adult U.S. citizens and permanent
residents (petitioners) are permitted to file papers requesting that family
members who have designated relationships (beneficiaries) be allowed to
immigrate to the United States.'3' Applications are categorized based on
both the immigration and citizenship status of petitioners and their
relationship to beneficiaries. Citizen petitioners are granted priority over
127. See 8 U.S.C. § ii5I(a) (2000); STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND
POLICY 241 (4th ed. 2005). The diversity program awards a fixed number of visas via a lottery to
applicants from "low admission states" and "low admission regions." Ostensibly, the visa lottery is
intended to diversify the flow of immigrants, which in practice has meant that "the so-called diversity
visa system favors white immigrants by preferring noncitizens from 'low-immigrant countries' in the
allocation of visas." Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 220 (2003); see also Bill
Ong Hing, No Place for Angels: In Reaction to Kevin Johnson, 20oo U. ILL. L. REV. 559, 587-89
(describing effective exclusion of Asians and Latinos from diversity lottery scheme); Stephen H.
Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 3i9, 321, 329-30 (1993);
Victor C. Romero, Critical Race Theory in Three Acts: Racial Profiling, Affirmative Action, and the
Diversity Visa Lottery, 66 ALB. L. REV. 375, 382-83 (2002).
128. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.J6 (2000) (relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture).
129. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000) (asylum); id. § 1231 (2000) (withholding of removal).
13o. KELLY JEFFERYS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ANNUAL
FLOW REPORT: U.S. LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2006 1 (2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
statistics/publications/IS-4496_LPRFlowReport o4vaccessible.pdf. Of the 1,266,264 total admissions as
permanent residents, 803,335 were through the family-sponsored program. Id.
131. See 8 U.S.C. §§ II5i(b)(2)(A)(i), 1153(a) (200o). But cf BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR
SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 119 (2006) ("Once Asian and Latin immigrants
began to dominate the family categories, the kinship system was attacked.").
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legal permanent resident petitioners, and traditional nuclear family
relationships are granted priority over family relationships that
immigration law deems less important.'3' The parent-child relationship is
prominent in this hierarchy, and even the sibling relationship requires
evidence of shared parentage. This framework is rigidly followed and
family relationships not specified by statute do not qualify.'33
The family-sponsored immigration system permits U.S. citizen or
permanent resident parents to petition for the permanent residency of
their children under age twenty-one.'34 Further, children of parents who
are direct beneficiaries of spousal, adult son or daughter, or sibling
petitions sometimes may benefit derivatively from the primary petition.'35
The most preferred category, which includes U.S. citizens petitioning for
children, has no numerical limits and thus no backlog except that arising
from bureaucratic delay.', 6 Other categories are numerically limited and
backlogs of many years have developed, such as a delay of more than five
years for a permanent resident petitioning for a child or spouse.'37 In
total, children comprised 29% of new permanent residents via family-
sponsored immigration provisions in fiscal year 2005.138
Additionally, family relationships are responsible for significant
portions of the other two primary immigration avenues as children and
132. See HING, supra note 131, at I. Immigration law continues its reliance on the model of
traditional nuclear families despite their diminished dominance and the increasing prevalence of
alternative families. See Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family and
Marriage? Immigration Law's Conflicted Answers, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 276 (2003).
133. See Suriel de Batista v. Gonzalez, 494 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting argument that
nephew raised as a son qualified as child); Moreno-Morante v. Gonzalez, 490 F.3d 1172, 1176-78 (9th
Cir. 2007) (holding that grandparent with legal guardianship of grandchildren was not parent of "de
facto" children).
134. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1153(a) (2000).
135. See id. § 1153(d).
136. See id. § 1151(b). The absence of a backlog related to numerical limitation does not mean that
bureaucratic delays in processing are insignificant. They generally last many months and sometimes
years.
137. According to the July 2007 Visa Bulletin issued by the Department of State, the government
then was processing visas for the spouses and minor children of legal permanent residents who applied
in June 2002, a wait of slightly more than five years. U.S. Dep't of State, Visa Bulletin for July 2oo7,
http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvilbulletin/bulletin-.3258.html (last visited Jan. I, 2oo8). Due to per
country limits, the wait is longer for countries of high immigration-in this same month the
government began processing applications filed nearly six years earlier in August 2001 for the spouses
and minor children of legal permanent residents coming from Mexico. Id. The longest backlog was for
the lowest priority category, siblings of U.S. citizens, from the Philippines-in July 2oo7 the
government began processing applications filed twenty-two years earlier in April 1985.
138. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2005 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 20-23 tbl.7 (2oo6), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/
yearbook/2005/OIS2005_Yearbook.pdf (showing 187,949 of 649,201 family-sponsored immigrants in
derivative child classifications).
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spouses often may be included as "derivatives" of principal immigrants
granted employment-based visas and diversity visas.'39 As derivatives, in
fiscal year 2005 children comprised 24% of new permanent residents via
the employment-based avenue'40 and 24% of new permanent residents
via the diversity route.' 4' Overall, 26% of new permanent residents were
under age twenty-one in fiscal year 2oo6141
Given the numbers of children who benefit from this scheme, it is
easy to perceive the immigration system as one designed with children's
interests in mind. However, immigration law devalues children's interests
and their roles in families. The primary mechanism to accomplish this is
by subordinating children's interests to those of their parents. Children
only benefit from major immigration programs if their parents benefit
and then only if their parents choose to share this benefit with them.
When parents have or achieve legal immigration status or
citizenship, they may be able to include children or extend this benefit to
them.4 3 Even if legally entitled, parents may choose not to do so and an
"unfortunately common problem with the family-based immigration
regime... [is that] [d]erivative beneficiaries are just that-derivative-
meaning that they have few rights of their own and instead depend on
the competence and cooperation of the principal immigrant."'" Even if
parents are cooperative, not all are competent. Children are held back in
this system by parents who do not qualify, are disqualified by some
aspect of their background such as a criminal record or immigration
violation, or are simply unsuccessful in steering a course through the
minefield of immigration by, for example, not using an attorney but
rather trusting a "notario" who files botched papers.'45
139. See 8 U.S.C. § I1 53(d) (2ooo). For example, the spouse and minor children of the recipient of
a diversity immigrant visa may qualify to accompany the principal immigrant.
140. Of 246,877 employment-based admissions to legal permanent residents, 6o,18i or 24% were
issued to children of the principal immigrant worker. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note
138, at 21-22 at tbl.7 (2006).
141. Id. (showing IO,987 of 46,234 diversity visas issued to children).
142. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2006 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 25 tbl.8 (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assetslstatistics/
yearbook/2oo6/OIS_2oo6 Yearbook.pdf (showing 329,599 of the total 1,266,264 legal permanent
residents under age twenty-one).
143. See 8 U.S.C. § 115I(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000) (relating to petitions for children by U.S. citizen
parents); id. § 1153(a)(2) (relating to petitions for children by permanent resident parents).
144. Fornalik v. Perryman, 223 F.3d 523, 527-28 (7th Cir. 200o) (describing abusive father's failure
to include his seventeen-year-old son in an immigration petition for other family members which led
to determination to deport him alone back to Poland while leaving his mother and siblings in the
United States).
145. See Thronson, supra note 28, at 1 182 ("To the extent that the framework for family-sponsored
and derivative immigration tends to achieve family integrity, it does so by ceding control over a child's
status to parents and by denying opportunities for children to achieve legal status as children without
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In contrast, when children rather than parents have legal
immigration status or citizenship, they are not able to petition for parents
or siblings. ,6 The result is an asymmetric system, "geared to assimilate
children's status to that of their parents, not the other way around."'47
Immigration law's view of family is entirely parent-centered, as "the
family immigration provisions of immigration law turn a blind eye to
families in which only children hold legal immigration status. Children's
interests in family integrity do not serve as a basis for possible extension
of immigration status."'
Immigration law, therefore, does not provide any benefit on the
basis of being a child generally, but rather only on the basis of being
someone's child.'49 More specifically, the key to accessing immigration
benefits as a child lies in having the right parent, i.e. a successful
immigrant or U.S. citizen. Moreover, children must have a parent-child
relationship that immigration law will recognize.
2. "Some but Not All"- Child Custody and the Definition of a
"Child"
Immigration law provides benefits as "children" only to those who
happen to be the children of parents who competently navigate the
immigration and nationality system. Children who lack such a parent are
their parents.").
146. U.S. citizens may petition for their parents, but not until they reach age twenty-one. 8 U.S.C.
§ II5i(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
147. Thronson, supra note 50, at 7I; see Thronson, supra note 28, at 1182 ("If the parents' attempts
to immigrate fail, the attempts of their derivative children will fail as well. In other words, this
framework is set up in a manner that seeks to ensure that children will not acquire any immigration
rights denied to parents through family related immigration."); see also Jacqueline Bhabha, The "Mere
Fortuity" of Birth? Are Children Citizens?, 15 DIFFERENCES: J. FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD., Summer
2004, at 91, 95 (discussing the "striking asymmetry in the family reunification rights of similarly placed
adults and minor children").
148. Thronson, supra note 5o, at 72.
149. Though not able to claim an immigration benefit based on being a child and not accorded
procedural or substantive accommodation as a child, unaccompanied children may apply in the same
manner as adults for other forms of immigration relief for which they might qualify, including as
asylum or protection from removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture. See, e.g., Gonzalez v.
Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1347 n.8 (Ilth Cir. 2000) (affirming that any person, regardless of age, may apply
for asylum); Christopher Nugent, Whose Children Are These? Towards Ensuring the Best Interests and
Empowerment of Unaccompanied Alien Children, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219, 219 (2006). In
immigration law the dominant view of children as objects often improperly inhibits children from
advancing their individual rights and perspectives, especially when they are not alone. Cf. Don v.
Gonzalez, 476 F.3d 738, 739 n.i (9th Cir. 2007) ("Don is the principal or lead petitioner; his wife's and
child's petitions are derivative of his petition. Therefore, their asylum claims succeed or fail with Don's
claims."). Finally, a form of immigration relief known as special immigrant juvenile status is available
to some undocumented children who are dependent upon a juvenile court. See 8 U.S.C.
§ IIOI(a)(27)(J) (2000); David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of
Children's Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIo ST. L.J. 979, 998 n. I I6 (2002).
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excluded from any benefit under dominant avenues of legal immigration.
Even children with the "right" parent face another barrier: for purposes
of immigration law, a child is recognized as a "child" only by conforming
to a statutory definition the Supreme Court has described as
"particularly exhaustive."'50
Whether a child fits the legal definition of a "child" under
immigration law determines whether even a willing parent with
qualifying immigration or citizenship status can petition for the child to
receive an immigration benefit on the basis of being a child. Child
custody plays a fickle role in this definition, always present and
sporadically prominent. As perhaps should be expected given the parent-
centered nature of the family-sponsored immigration system, notions of
dependency are pervasive in immigration law's definition of a "child,"
with roots that run deep.
In 1882 the first general immigration law enshrined the nation's
disfavor of poor immigrants by specifically excluding from admission to
the country any person likely to become a public charge.'5 ' This
restriction on admission to the United States has survived every revision
of immigration law and remains in place today.'52 One way persons may
demonstrate that they will not become a public charge is by establishing
their dependency upon someone else: when Congress reaffirmed the
exclusion of the poor in an 1891 statute it added the proviso that "this
section shall not be held to exclude persons living in the United States
from sending for a relative."'53 This early pattern of allowing a relative
established in the United States to extend an immigration benefit persists
in modern immigration law in the United States.
Though not at first explicit, the law and attitudes of the late
nineteenth century certainly contemplated that those able to extend an
immigration benefit to their relatives would be husbands and fathers, not
wives, mothers and children. In 1903, immigration law was amended to
provide that when a noncitizen
send[s] for his wife or minor children to join him, if said wife, or either
of said children, shall be found to be affected with any contagious
150. INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85, 88 (1986) (per curiam).
15i. See Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 3 ("[I1f on... examination there shall be found among such
passengers... any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public
charge ... such persons shall not be permitted to land."). Those likely to become a public charge were
joined in the excluded category by "idiots," "lunatics," and "convicts." Id.
152. See 8 U.S.C. § II82(a)(4) (2ooo) ("Any alien who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the
time of the application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time of application
for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible.").
153. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. io84, 1O84.
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disorder, and if it is proved that said disorder was contracted on board
the ship in which they came ... such wife or children shall be held ...
until it shall be determined whether the disorder will be easily curable,
or whether they can be permitted to land without danger to other
persons; and they shall not be deported until such facts have been
ascertained."
This small protection from deportation is an example of another
lasting pattern in immigration law in which family relationships may be
the basis for relief from deportation that the law otherwise would
require. As is still the case, the benefit flows from parent to child and not
in the other direction.
Lest there was any doubt that children were viewed as those to be
sent for and not those doing the sending, immigration law soon
specifically excluded "all children under sixteen years of age,
unaccompanied by one or both of their parents."' 5 Children, therefore,
were admissible only as dependents and not as individuals; as objects not
agents. In this respect, before any numerical restrictions on immigration
were put in place and long before family relationships formally were
ensconced as the dominant means to immigrate to the United States,
immigration law embraced a limited view of children as dependents. This
devaluation of children persists today in immigration law.
For the purposes of immigration law as set out in Title II of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, "child" is an evolving term of art
limited to "an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age" who
falls into one of six"56 precisely delimited categories, the relevant portions
of which are set out below:
i. A "child born in wedlock";'"
2. A "stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock, provided the
child had not reached the age of eighteen years at the time the
marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred";"8
3. A "child legitimated under the law of the child's residence or
154. Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 37, Pub. L. No. 59-96, 34 Stat. 898, 899.
155. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134
, 
§ 2, Pub. L. No. 57-162, 32 Stat. 1213, 1221.
156. See Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. IO6-279, Title II, § 302(a), Title V,
§ 505(a)(2), (b), 114 Stat. 838, 844 (2ooo) (noting that a seventh category related to adopted children
"shall take effect upon the entry into force of the Convention [on Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption done at The Hague on May 29, 1993] for the United
States pursuant to Article 46(2)(a) of the Convention"). For the U.S. Department of State's
description of the convoluted ratification saga of this convention, see http://travel.state.gov/family/
adoption/convention/convention_229o.html. The future language that potentially will be incorporated
by this pending amendment to the definition of child does not alter the analysis in this article.
157. 8 U.S.C. § Iio(b)(1)(A) (2ooo).
158. Id. § iioi(b)(i)(B).
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domicile, or under the law of the father's residence or domicile,
whether in or outside the United States, if such legitimation takes place
before the child reaches the age of eighteen years and the child is in the
legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of such
legitimation"; 's9
4. A "child born out of wedlock, by, through whom, or on whose
behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the
relationship of the child to its natural mother or to its natural father if
the father has or had a bona fide parent-child relationship with the
person"; '6°
5. A "child adopted while under the age of sixteen years if the child
has been in the legal custody of, and has resided with, the adopting
parent or parents for at least two years";1
6
1
6. A "child, under the age of sixteen at the time a petition is filed in his
behalf to accord a classification as an immediate relative under section
III(b) of this title, who is an orphan because of the death or
disappearance of, abandonment or desertion by, or separation or loss
from, both parents, or for whom the sole or surviving parent is
incapable of providing the proper care and has in writing irrevocably
released the child for emigration and adoption; who has been adopted
abroad by a United States citizen and spouse jointly, or by an
unmarried United States citizen at least twenty-five years of age, who
personally saw and observed the child prior to or during the adoption
proceedings; or who is coming to the United States for adoption by a
United States citizen and spouse jointly, or by an unmarried United
States citizen at least twenty-five years of age, who have or has
complied with the preadoption requirements, if any, of the child's
proposed residence.'
6
1
The circularity inherent in defining a "child" for immigration purposes
by using the term "child" in each subpart is the first indication that this
definition is designed to exclude many children. Not every child will be a
"child" for immigration purposes.
The parameters of these categories are construed quite literally and
functional equivalents are rejected. Relationships falling outside the
precise language of the statute that mimic, approximate or functionally
match these categories are not sufficient to establish a parent-child
159. Id. § sioi(b)(I)(C).
16o. Id. § iioI(b)(I)(D).
161. Id. § iIoI(b)(i)(E)(i). Additionally, a natural sibling of a child adopted while under age
sixteen may qualify as a child for immigration purposes on the basis of an adoption finalized while
under age eighteen. See id. § iioi(B)(i)(E)(ii).
162. Id. § iioi(b)(I)(F)(i).
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relationship for immigration purposes.6 For example, "even if [an
aunt's] relationship with her nieces closely resembles a parent-child
relationship, we are constrained to hold that Congress, through the plain
language of the statute, precluded this functional approach to defining
the term 'child. ', ' I6, Similarly, without regard to the actual assumption of
parenting responsibilities, a parent-child relationship for immigration
purposes is not formed between a man and the young son of the woman
with whom he lives for many years,' 6' between a grandfather and his
grandchildren-although he is their legal guardian, I66 or between a
woman and a nephew raised as a son. 
6
,
In tightly construing this statutory language, courts are not unaware
of the resulting harsh results. "To be sure, the [Immigration and
Nationality Act's] definition of 'child' may be far out of step with the
times, and may have particularly deleterious effects on aliens whose
culture's definition of 'family' is legitimately broader than the traditional
definition of those related by blood or adoption." '68 Still, "[a]s we have
explained with the technical definition of 'child' contained within this
statute: ... 'it could be argued that the line should have been drawn at a
different point... [but] these are policy questions entrusted exclusively
to the political branches of our government.""69
In establishing a parent-child relationship for immigration purposes,
therefore, the fine print is critical and implicates child custody in a
variety of ways. The precise requirements of the statutory definition are
sometimes in accord with baseline principles and broader trends in
family law, but often they are out of step with family law precepts, thus
warranting serious constitutional scrutiny if not arising in the
immigration and nationality context. In carving out statutory subsets of
the definition of "children," child custody plays a quirky and inconsistent
part.
163. Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and Immigration: A Roadmap for the Ruritanian Lawmaker,
43 AM. J. CoMP. L. 511, 529 (1995) (noting that the Immigration and Nationality Act "enumerates
recognized family relationships, and the courts have consistently rejected attempts to use surrogate
family relationships to meet statutory requirements").
164. INS v. Hector. 479 U.S. 85, 90 (1986) (per curiam) (reversing decision that that nieces aged
ten and eleven in the care of aunt for three years were the "functional equivalent" of children under
the Immigration and Nationality Act).
165. See Dorado v. Gonzalez, 202 F. App'x 898, 899 (6th Cir. 2006).
166. See Moreno-Morante v. Gonzalez, 490 F.3d 1172, 1176-78 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting argument
that grandchildren were "de facto" children).
167. See Perez Suriel de Batista v. Gonzalez, 494 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2007).
168. Dorado, 202 F. App'x at 902.
169. INS, 479 U.S. at 89 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798 (1977)).
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a. Child Custody, Gender, and Legitimacy
When a child is born to unmarried parents, for immigration purposes
the child is and remains a "child" of the "natural" mother without regard
to the subsequent relationship between the mother and child.'7" The same
is not true between children and fathers. With respect to fathers,
immigration law is more concerned with legitimacy than with biology.'7'
Establishing paternity is just the starting point for children born out of
wedlock: under immigration law, creation of a parent-child relationship
with a father requires that the father either has formally "legitimated"
the child or "has or had a bona fide parent-child relationship" with the
child. '7
Legitimacy has played an important role in immigration law even
without the gender distinction that triggers its relevance today. In 1952,
the original statutory definition of "child" for immigration purposes
included, along with stepchildren, only "legitimate" or "legitimated"
children.'73 Applying this early statutory definition resulted in denial of
an immigration petition from a U.S. citizen woman for her daughter
"fathered by a man other than the man the petitioner subsequently
married."'74 This harshness was ameliorated in 1957 by adding to the
definition of "child" those "illegitimate child[ren], by, through whom, or
on whose behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the
relationship of the child to its natural mother."'75 Short of legitimation,
however, a child still could not establish a parent-child relationship with
a biological father.
In Fiallo v. Bell, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional
170. See 8 U.S.C. § sIoI(b)(i)(A) (2000) (if born in wedlock); see id. § Iioi(b)(i)(D) (if born out
of wedlock).
171. See THE EFFECTS OF GENDER IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NINTH
CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE 114 (1993) ("An overt gender distinction is made in the definition
of the term 'illegitimate' child under the immigration and nationality laws."). In 1995, Congress shifted
from use of the term "legitimate" to "born in wedlock" in parts of the statutory definition of child, but
left the term in other parts. Compare 8 U.S.C. § iioi(b)(i)(A) (2000) (using the term "born in
wedlock"), with 8 U.S.C. § Iios(b)(i)(C) (2000) (using the term "legitimate").
172. 8 U.S.C. § lI o(b)(i)(D) (2000).
173. The relevant version of the statute defined a child as unmarried and
(A) A legitimate child; or (B) A stepchild, provided the child had not reached the age of 18
years at the time the marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred; or (C) A child
legitimated under the law of the child's residence or domicile, or under the law of the
father's residence or domicile, whether in or outside the United States, if such legitimation
takes place before the child reaches the age of 18 years and the child is in the legal custody
of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of such legitimation.
Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 171 (1952).
174. Matter of A, 5 I. & N. Dec. 272, 284 (B.I.A. 1953).
175. Act of Sept. ii, 1957, § 2, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639, 639.
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challenge to this "double-barreled" discrimination "based on sex and
illegitimacy" in the definition of "child.' ' 6 The Court found the statute's
distinctions between fathers and mothers and between children born in
and out of marriage among "many drawn by Congress pursuant to its
determination to provide some-but not all-families with relief from
various immigration restrictions that would otherwise hinder
reunification of the family in this country." '' There "is good reason to
think that Fiallo, decided in i977, would come out similarly today" given
the Court's more recent pronouncement in the citizenship context
upholding the "constitutionality of requirements that discriminated
against illegitimate children born abroad to U.S.-born fathers who sought
citizenship rather than immigration status.
'
078
In other contexts, the troubling notion of devaluing children as
"illegitimate" based on their parents' marital options and decisions is
plainly in disfavor.' 79 The Supreme Court has observed that
[t]he status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's
condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.
But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and
unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is
contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.
Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the
illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of
deterring the parent.
8 0
176. 430 U.S. 787,794 (1977). At the time, the statutory definition of "child" contained no
provisions regarding fathers with bona fide relationships with their children. See 8 U.S.C.
§ iioi(b)(i)(D) (977).
177. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 797 (977); cf. Patricia A. Cain, Dependency, Taxes, and
Alternative Families, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 267, 269 (2002) (observing that through federal tax law
"the government only supports some children" and "[t]he children it supports most-either directly or
indirectly-are children in family settings that include marriage").
178. Abrams, Immigration Law, supra note 26, at 1643 (discussing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53
(2oo)). Abrams goes on to note that "[t]he government has a legitimate interest, the Court found, in
giving citizenship status to children who have a genuine relationship with their citizen parent, and
because women are 'present' at the birth of their children, they are more likely than men to develop
such a relationship." Id.
179. For example, the Supreme Court has "reiterated that a statute completely disinheriting a
nonmarital child from its father's estate unless the child is subsequently legitimated by the marriage of
its parents is unconstitutional." Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional
Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 93, 112 n.64 (citing Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 854-55 (1986)).
Brashier also comments that "[t]he decreasing stigma attached to a nonmarital child's status is perhaps
implicitly reflected in the Reed opinion in which the Court refers to the protection of children born out
of wedlock rather than to illegitimates." Id.; see also Richard L. Brown, Disinheriting the "Legal
Orphan": Inheritance Rights of Children After Termination of Parental Rights, 70 Mo. L. REV. 125,
148-52 (2005).
18o. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972); accord N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v.
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Federal power regarding immigrants is not unlimited. At the least,
outside "matters of admission, exclusion, and deportation.., the alien
inhabits the domain of territorially present persons where different and
more protective rules against government power apply."'8 Still,
distinctions in federal laws directly regulating immigration admissions
and nationality have demonstrated a resistance to constitutional
challenge surpassing that seen in any other context. Is2
Under the current statute, therefore, children of unmarried parents
are not necessarily the children of their fathers for immigration purposes.
The statutory criteria to establish a parent-child relationship between
fathers and children born out of wedlock presents challenges that
implicate issues of child custody.
i. Child Custody and Legitimation
In evaluating if a child is a "child" for immigration purposes via the
legitimation prong, child custody is always at issue but rarely in a way
that would not be satisfied with a broad range of child custody
arrangements. The definition reaches a
child legitimated under the law of the child's residence or domicile, or
under the law of the father's residence or domicile, whether in or
outside the United States, if such legitimation takes place before the
child reaches the age of eighteen years and the child is in the legal
custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of suchlegitimation. '83
The term "legitimated" includes "those children who were illegitimate at
birth, but who thereafter through legally recognized means attained the
full legal status of legitimate children."'
s
First, child custody may accompany a variety of acts and
relationships that help establish legitimation under the laws of some
Cahill, 4I U.S. 619, 620(1973).
18I. Bosniak, supra note 63, at 1097-98; accord Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1I8 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); see
also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) ("[Wje have clearly held that the Fifth Amendment
protects aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful from invidious discrimination by the Federal
Government."); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 239 (1896) (rejecting punishment of
noncitizens without trial).
182. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 ("This Court has repeatedly emphasized that 'over no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of the Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of
aliens.") (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (I9O9)); Matthews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (976) ("In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."); see
also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 732 (1893) (upholding racially based deportation
law directed at Chinese laborers).
183. 8 U.S.C. § isoi(b)(i)(C) (2000).
184. Matter of Goorahoo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 782,784-85 (B.I.A. 1994).
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jurisdictions. Unless the residence and domicile of both the child and
father are the same, the legitimation laws of multiple jurisdictions will be
relevant.' s5 The statutory use of the disjunctive clarifies that legitimation
under any one applicable law suffices for immigration purposes and
legitimation need not be established under the laws of all relevant
jurisdictions.'6 This means that if a child is legitimated for immigration
purposes in one jurisdiction, any argument that a particular custody
ruling in -family court is needed to establish legitimacy in another is
overreaching.
Requirements for legitimation vary greatly by jurisdiction and child
custody is not relevant in many instances. At one end of the spectrum
immigration law recognizes universal legitimation based on adoption of a
law that sweepingly eliminates all legal distinctions between legitimate
and illegitimate children.'8' At the other, "an illegitimate child cannot be
made legitimate for general purposes" and thus under the laws of that
jurisdiction cannot obtain the full legal status of legitimate children that
immigration law requires.'S In between are a bewildering variety of
provisions under which legitimation might be completed by simply
acknowledging a child or establishing paternity'" or by judicial
proceedings resulting in formal declarations of legitimacy. The
requirements for legitimation in many jurisdictions include intermarriage
of the natural parents, sometimes as the only possible avenue to
185. Id.
186. See 8 U.S.C. § iIoi(b)(i)(C) (2000); see also Matter of Martinez, i8 1. & N. Dec. 399 (B.I.A.
1983).
187. Matter of Clahar, 18 I. & N. Dec. I (B.I.A. 1981) (regarding Jamaican law eliminating all legal
distinctions based on birth in or out of wedlock).
I88. In Indiana, for example, "[u]nder the present law, an illegitimate child cannot be made
legitimate for general purposes, but may, if the proper prerequisites are met, be treated as legitimate
for purposes of inheritance." J. ERIC SMITHBURN, I4 IND. PRACTICE SERIES § 4.13 (2o06).
189. In its Foreign Affairs Manual, the U.S. Department of State has created, yet rarely updates, a
listing of some legitimation information by jurisdiction, foreign and domestic. See 7 U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § I 133.4-2a (2007) [hereinafter FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL], available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86757.pdf. Unofficial compilations also exist. See
DANIEL LEVY, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION HANDBOOK, app. 4-26 (2oo6).
i9o. See, e.g., In re Moraga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 195, 199 (B.I.A. 2001) (recognizing that in El Salvador
a child is legitimated once paternity is established and overturning prior case law reaching opposite
conclusion).
191. In North Carolina, for instance,
[t]he putative father of any child born out of wedlock, whether such father resides in North
Carolina or not, may apply by a verified written petition, filed in a special proceeding in the
superior court of the county in which the putative father resides or in the superior court of
the county in which the child resides, praying that such child be declared legitimate.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-10 (2005).
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legitimation.9' Some jurisdictions provide legitimation via actions that
children can initiate, but the majority empower the father to legitimate
or not without regard for the child's interests.
Yet child custody remains a relevant consideration in every claim to
establish a parent-child relationship for immigration purposes because
the statute requires not only legitimation, but also that "the child is in the
legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of such
legitimation.' 93 This requirement, however, is easily met.
According to the Board of Immigration Appeals, "where a child
born out of wedlock has been properly legitimated, neither parent will be
presumed to have a greater right than the other to the legal custody of
that child.' ' 94 Prior to this ruling, a father had to obtain a legal decree of
custody prior to legitimation to establish that the child was in his custody
at the moment of legitimation. Under the current understanding, "a
father of an illegitimate child will no longer have to know in advance of
[8 U.S.C. § iioi(b)(i)(C)'s] legal custody requirement in order to satisfy
that requirement."'95 At the time of legitimation, therefore, "[u]nless
there is evidence to show that the father of a legitimated child has been
deprived of his natural right to custody, he will be presumed to share
custody with the mother, and to satisfy the legal custody requirement of
[8 U.S.C. § iioi(b)(i)(C)]."'
Unless there is formal action depriving a father of custody, the role
of child custody in meeting the requirements for recognition as a "child"
via legitimation becomes largely pro forma. The specific mention of legal
custody in the definition makes for a facially tempting argument that
children might not qualify in the absence of an assignment of custody to
their fathers, but this collapses on closer scrutiny.
More generally, legitimation litigation is most common after the fact,
in trying to prove that legitimation took place at some time in the past.
The U.S. Department of State advises its consular officers that
192. Nebraska is one such jurisdiction. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-14o6 (2004). Interestingly,
immigration regulations indicate that marriage of natural parents is sufficient, without regard to
additional requirements for legitimation, such as acknowledgement, that many jurisdictions impose. 8
C.F.R. § 20 4 .2(d)(2)(ii) (2007) ("A child can be legitimated through the marriage of his or her natural
parents."). Of course, this avenue for legitimation excludes children of same sex partners.
193. 8 U.S.C. § ioI(b)(l)(C) (2000).
194. Matter of Rivers, i7 I. & N. Dec. 419, 421 (B.I.A. 598o) (rejecting holding that legal custody
would vest only by virtue of either a natural right or a court decree); see also 7 CHARLES GORDON ET
AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 98.03[31[f] (1997) (noting that "while the mother of a child
born out of wedlock ordinarily is regarded as having legal custody, the father will be regarded as
having equal right to legal custody at the time of legitimation").
195. Maner of Rivers, 17 1. & N. Dec. at 423.
I96. Id.
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"[legitimation is best used to establish relationship only in cases where
the legitimating act has already taken place and evidence is readily
available.'"' 9 Further, it cautions not to "inconvenience applicants by
requiring them to submit extensive evidence of legitimation or expend
resources to research or interpret foreign legitimation laws.""' Moreover,
in immigration law proving "a child legitimate or legitimated generally
benefits the child for purposes of preference classification,"' so it is
ironic that in the citizenship context this same "determination that
accords a benefit in visa petition proceedings may become a
detriment. ' " Given the complexity and potential harm, establishing
compliance with the "child" definition via legitimacy generally is not the
first, best option. Especially if a child is under age eighteen, the cutoff
age for legitimation to count, there usually are easier ways to establish a
parent-child relationship for purposes of immigration law.
ii. Child Custody and Bona Fide Parent-Child
Relationships
Instead of establishing legitimation, a "purported father of a child or
son or daughter born out of wedlock" who seeks to petition for his child,
can "show that he is the natural father and that a bona fide parent-child
relationship was established when the child or son or daughter was
unmarried and under twenty-one years of age ..... Meeting this is not
particularly onerous, though it does require "more than merely a
biological relationship .... . By regulation, a bona fide parent-child
relationship "will be deemed to exist or to have existed where the father
demonstrates or has demonstrated an active concern for the child's
support, instruction, and general welfare.""2 3
Establishing a bona fide relationship thus does not require a formal
finding of legal custody or any particular allocation of parenting
responsibilities. The requirement can be met by evidence of "[e]motional
and/or financial ties or a genuine concern and interest by the father."' 4
197. FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 189, § 1133.4-2(4)(a)(v) (2007).
I98. Id. The Adjudicator's Field Manual for U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services warns its
officers, who generally are not attorneys, that "[y]ou may also consult the Foreign Affairs Manual or
inquire with the Library of Congress if there are questions that still need to be resolved regarding the
legitimation requirements of a particular country." U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
ADJUDICATOR'S FIELD MANUAL-REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION § 71.i(d)(2) (2007) [hereinafter FIELD
MANUAL], http://www.uscis.gov/propub/DocView/afmid/i#o-o-o-35o (follow "71.1" hyperlink).
199. In re Rowe, 23 I. & N. Dec. 962, 965 (B.I.A. 2006).
200. Id.
201. 8 C.F.R. § 204 .2(d)(2)(iii) (2007).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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Given the reality that many immigration petitions involve years of
backlogs and family separation, immigration regulations specifically
acknowledge the possibility that the children and the father might have
never "actually lived together" and provide that where they did not live
together there simply should be evidence that "the father held the child
out as his own, that he provided for some or all of the child's needs, or
that in general the father's behavior evidenced a genuine concern for the
child."2 5
Immigration law's dominant view of children as dependents and
potential public charges is evident in the details of possible ways to
demonstrate genuine concern, including but not limited to "money order
receipts or cancelled checks showing the father's financial support of the
beneficiary [child]; the father's income tax returns; [and] the father's
medical or insurance records which include the beneficiary as a
dependent.'26 Other evidence might include "school records for the
beneficiary; correspondence between the parties; or notarized affidavits
of friends, neighbors, school officials, or other associates knowledgeable
about the relationship."2"
A family court order establishing the father's custody would be
relevant to establishing a parent-child relationship but it is not necessary.
At the same time, if establishing a parent-child relationship benefits the
child, without regard to child custody, a family court determining the
custody of a child certainly could exercise its equitable powers to require
financial support and other indicia of a bona fide parent-child
relationship.
b. Child Custody and Stepparents
Surprisingly, given the complexity of establishing a parent-child
relationship for fathers generally, immigration law recognizes a stepchild
as a "child" for immigration purposes quite readily, as long as the child
has "not reached the age of eighteen years at the time the marriage
creating the status of stepchild occurred. ' '2 "8 Ironically, the bar is much
lower to establish a stepparent-child relationship under immigration law
than it is to establish a parent-child relationship." Evidentiary
requirements to establish a stepchild relationship include only the birth
certificate of the stepchild naming the biological parent, the marriage
certificate of biological parent and stepparent, and evidence of
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 8 U.S.C. § ilol(b)(i)(B) (2oo0).
209. As will be discussed below, however, a stepparent relationship is not recognized for
citizenship purposes. See id. § x ioi(c)(I); see also infra note 212 and accompanying text.
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termination of any previous marriages of the parents."' t
Relying on the simple language of the statute, the Ninth Circuit
firmly rejected a government attempt to require that a stepparent have
an "active parental interest" or show that that stepparent and stepchild
be part of a "close family unit ..... Therefore, without regard to the nature
of the relationship, "persons who become stepchildren through the
marriage of a natural parent prior to their eighteenth birthday are
entitled to visa preference as a class under section ioI(b)(I)(B) without
further qualification .... Thus, a child's custody has no impact on
qualifying as a "child" of the natural parent's spouse for immigration
purposes as a stepchild. Any immigration petition that the natural parent
could file on behalf of the child could then be filed by the stepparent
without regard to the existence of any real relationship."3
A stepparent relationship normally ceases upon divorce of the
natural parent and stepparent."4 However, "under certain circumstances
a step relationship may continue after the death of the natural parent or
even after the legal separation or divorce of the stepparent and natural
parent if there is an ongoing relationship between the stepparent and
stepchild. '1 5 In such instances, "the appropriate inquiry is whether a
family relationship has continued to exist as a matter of fact between the
stepparent and stepchild. '2, 6 "If the marriage ends in annulment,
however, the step relationship is deemed to have never existed because
legally the marriage never existed. 217 If a child's immigration status is
reliant on a stepparent, these considerations might have bearing on
family court proceedings regarding the dissolution of the marriage even
though no particular custody arrangement is required.
c. Child Custody and Adopted Children
Immigration law has always been skeptical of adoption. The first
21o. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(iv) (2oo7). This is, of course, "assuming that the marriage is not a
sham or does not violate the Defense of Marriage Act." FIELD MANUAL, supra note 198,
§ 21. 4 (d)(2)(A) (2007); see also Matter of Awwal, 19 1. & N. Dec. 617, 621-22 (B.I.A. 1988) (holding
that even where there is an ongoing actual family relationship between stepparent and child, the
relationship cannot be recognized where the marriage creating the step-relationship was a sham).
211. Palmer v. Reddy, 622 F.2d 463, 464 (9th Cir. 198o); accord Matter of McMillan, 17 I. & N.
Dec. 605, 6o6 (B.I.A. 1981) (extending the Ninth Circuit rule nationwide).
212. McMillan, 17 1. & N. Dec. at 6o6.
213. FIELD MANUAL, supra note 198, § 21. 4(d)(2)(B) (2007) ("The creation of a step relationship in
no way terminates the relationship between the child and his or her other natural parent (i.e., the one
who did not marry the stepparent)."). The child may later in life petition for the natural parent, but
the child cannot do so until reaching age twenty-one. See 8 U.S.C. § 15I(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
214. Matter of Simicevic, tO 1. & N. Dec. 363, 364-65 (B.I.A. 1963).
215. FIELD MANUAL, supra note 198, § 21. 4(d)(2)(B) (2007).
216. Matter of Mourillon, 18 1. & N. Dec. 122, 125 (B.I.A. 1981).
217. FIELD MANUAL, supra note 198, § 21.4(d)(2)(B) (2007).
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statutory definition of the term "child" in immigration law was in the
negative, proclaiming only that "[t]he terms 'child,' 'father,' and
'mother,' do not include a child or parent by adoption. ' ' ,8 Similarly, the
first attempt at a positive statutory definition of child, the original
version of today's definition, did not include adopted children. 2 9 Not
until 1957 was the possibility of an adopted child becoming a "child" for
immigration purposes incorporated into immigration law."'
Today's statute contains two separate provisions delineating when
adopted children can be recognized as children for immigration
purposes. ' One of these is aimed at "orphans" who have "been adopted
abroad" and is the provision that covers most overseas adoptions. ' This
provision only applies to U.S. citizen parents who are eligible to bring the
adopted child to the United States without years of backlog in the
immigration process.2 3 Immigration of the child to the United States
through this provision follows an extensive pre-adoption qualification
process and subsequent child custody determinations are not normally
relevant for immigration law purposes because arranging a visa for the
child is part of this process. Further, when children arrive as permanent
residents under this provision they generally will become U.S. citizens
upon arrival, as discussed below.
In contrast, child custody plays an express and central role in
establishing a parent-child relationship under other adoption provisions.
This portion of the statutory definition of child reaches a "child adopted
while under the age of sixteen years if the child has been in the legal
custody of, and has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at
least two years." '24 This provision applies without regard to place. It
provides an avenue to establish a parent-child relationship for
218. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 19o, § 28, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153, 169 (1924); see Matter
of A, 5 I. & N. Dec. 272, 273 (B.I.A. 1953).
219. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 171 (1952); see Matter of
Repuyan, 19 1. & N. Dec. 119, 121-22 (B.I.A. 1984) ("Adoptees were not included as children in the
1952 revision of the immigration laws, despite a recommendation to do so by the Senate Judiciary
Committee.").
220. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, § 2, Pub. L. No. 85-316,71 STAT. 639,639 (1957).
221. As noted above, a third is pending entry into force of the Convention on Protection of
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. See supra note 156.
222. 8 U.S.C. § IioI(b)(I)(F) (2ooo).
223. The definition reaches a "child, under the age of sixteen at the time a petition is filed in his
behalf to accord a classification as an immediate relative under section 1 15I(b) of this title." Id. The
referenced petition is an immediate relative petition that only a U.S. citizen can make. See Moreno-
Morante v. Gonzalez, 49o F.3 d 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the impossibility of establishing a parent-
child relationship between an unauthorized-immigrant adopting parent and adopted U.S.-citizen
children who cannot file such a petition).
224. 8 U.S.C. § liol(b)(I)(E) (2ooo).
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immigration purposes for children already here in the United States who
cannot meet the "adopted abroad" criteria of the other adoption
provision. It also applies to children adopted abroad. As such, both the
legal custody and residence requirements may be implicated in child
custody determinations.
For purposes of this provision, "legal custody" is defined to mean
"the assumption of responsibility for a minor by an adult under the laws
of the state and under the order or approval of a court of law or other
appropriate government entity.",125 In contrast to the easy assumption of
custody discussed in the legitimation context, informal care
arrangements are insufficient here, and "Lt]his provision requires that a
legal process involving the courts or other recognized government entity
take place.""' 6 The adoption decree may be satisfactory to establish
custody, though other determinations of custody may have relevance
given that "[llegal custody and residence occurring prior to or after the
adoption will satisfy both requirements." ' The duration of both legal
custody and residence is "accounted for in the aggregate. Therefore, a
break in legal custody or residence will not affect the time already
fulfilled." 2,8 The child must be under age sixteen at the time the adoption
is finalized, but the duration of legal custody and residence requirements
can be met later.
The residence requirement "implies that the child resides in a home
established by the adopting parent., 29 This means that "mere periodic
visits by an adopting parent in the home of the child do not satisfy the
residence requirement." 3' Although residence is accumulated in the
aggregate, the time that counts is the child's time in the parent's home,
not the parent's time in the child's home elsewhere.
Moreover, the residence requirement can require "more than simply
that the adopted child and adoptive parent live together in the same
residence for 2 years."23' To avoid the conclusion that an adoption is a
sham, when an "adopted child continues to reside in the same household
with the natural parent or parents... the petitioner has the burden of
establishing that the adoptive parent exercised primary parental control
225. 8 C.F.R. § 20 4 .2(d)(2)(Vii)(A) (20o7).
226. Id.
227. Id. § 204.2(d)(2)(Vii)(C).
228. Id.; see also Matter of M, 8 1. & N. Dec. i i8 (B.I.A. 1958).
229. Matter of Repuyan, 19 1. & N. Dec. 119, 120-21 (B.I.A. 1984); accord Moge v. Morris, 470 F.
Supp. 556, 559 (D.C. Pa. 1979) (noting that an "adoption is not recognized as valid for the purposes of
the immigration laws [where] the children are not residing with the adoptive parents").
230. Repuyan, 19 1. & N. Dec. at 121.
231. Matter of Marquez, 20 I. & N. Dec. i6o, 64 (B.I.A. 199o).
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during the period of residence." '232
Until this point, child custody's role in establishing a parent-child
relationship has been relevant, but hardly of great significance. In the
context of adopted children, however, it takes on real importance. The
legal formalities of establishing custody matter, as do living
arrangements. More analysis of this distinction will follow, but first it is
important to discuss the treatment of children and child custody in
citizenship law.
C. CHILD CUSTODY IN CITIZENSHIP
As noted at the outset of this exploration of immigration and
nationality law, the statutory framework for determining who is or may
become a U.S. citizen is distinct from, though interrelated with,
immigration laws governing the admission and removal of immigrants. 33
Eschewing consistency, the Immigration and Nationality Act introduces
a new definition of "child" for its citizenship laws:
The term "child" means an unmarried person under twenty-one years
of age and includes a child legitimated under the law of the child's
residence or domicile, or under the law of the father's residence or
domicile, whether in the United States or elsewhere, and, except as
otherwise provided in sections 1431 and 1432 of this title, a child
adopted in the United States, if such legitimation or adoption takes
place before the child reaches the age of i6 years (except to the extent
that the child is described in subparagraph (E)(ii) or (F)(ii) of
subsection (b)(i) of this section), and the child is in the legal custody of
the legitimating or adopting parent or parents at the time of such
legitimation or adoption.34
Much here is familiar, though several distinctions between this definition
and that of immigration law are worth noting.
First, two avenues that are available to establish parent-child
relationships under immigration law are missing here. Citizenship law
does not recognize a "child" on the basis of a stepparent relationship or
via demonstrating a bona fide parent-child relationship. The absence of
these avenues, as will be discussed below, perhaps is somewhat mitigated
at points by citizenship law's occasional use of the term "person" instead
232. Matter of Cuello, 20 I. & N. Dec. 94, 97 (BTA. 1989); accord 8 C.F.R. § 20 4 .2(d)(2)(vii)(B)
(2007) ("When the adopted child continued to reside in the same household as the natural parent(s)
during the period in which the adoptive parent petitioner seeks to establish his or her compliance with
this requirement, the petitioner has the burden of establishing that he or she exercised primary
parental control during that period of residence.").
233. Citizenship laws are set out primarily in Title III of the Immigration and Nationality Act and
codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1504 (2000).
234. Id. § iiol(c)(i).
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of "child," reducing the importance of qualifying as a child in some
contexts.
Second, the requirements for establishing a parent-child relationship
via legitimation are similar to those in the immigration definition, with
the slightly different age requirement that legitimation occur before the
child reaches age sixteen. The requirement of legal custody at the time of
legitimation tracks the language found in the immigration definition.
Third, the adoption portion of the definition contains the same age
limit of sixteen years, but does not include the requirement of two years
of legal custody and residence found in the immigration definition.
Instead, it requires legal custody at the time of adoption, mirroring the
legitimacy provision, without specifying any particular duration. Also,
this definition reaches only "a child adopted in the United States," so
that children adopted abroad are not children for citizenship purposes.
They still qualify for certain citizenship benefits, however, through a
statutory fix that will be discussed below.
With these distinctions in hand, it is time to explore the role of child
custody in three avenues to U.S. citizenship: birth in the United States,
acquisition at birth, and derivation.
i. Child Custody and Jus Soli Citizenship
The most common method of attaining citizenship, through birth
within the United States or jus soli citizenship, is not affected by child
custody determinations. "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside." '35 In 1884, Native
Americans born within the United States but within tribal authority were
adjudicated "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States and thus
did not acquire U.S. citizenship at birth under the Fourteenth
Amendment.236 The Court later identified the only other persons falling
outside the "subject to the jurisdiction" clause as "children born of alien
enemies in hostile occupation, and children of diplomatic representatives
of a foreign State." '237 The constitutional mandate of the Fourteenth
Amendment now is incorporated into statute and regulation, with the
explanation that "[a] child born in the United States is born subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States and is a United States citizen if the
parent is not a 'foreign diplomatic officer. ' ' ' 3' Calls for reinterpretation
235. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i.
236. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, IO9 (1884). U.S. citizenship at birth is now conferred to affected
Native Americans by statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 14oI(b) (2000).
237. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,682 (I898).
238. 8 C.F.R. § 110.3(b) (2oo7); see also 8 U.S.C. § i4oi(a) (2000).
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, or for statutory and constitutional
amendment, "to restrict the acquisition of citizenship by the children of
undocumented immigrants are often advanced, but none have gained
sufficient support to have any realistic chance of enactment."' 3 9 In the
meantime, more than a century of settled interpretation and
understanding leaves no doubt about the citizenship of children born in
the United States.
Unless their parents are diplomatic officers recognized as such by
the United States, all children born in the United States are U.S. citizens
without regard to the citizenship or immigration status of their parents
and without regard to whether they are in the custody of a U.S. citizen
parent.24 Citizenship adheres at birth and subsequent decisions regarding
child custody will not alter the child's citizenship. 4'
2. Child Custody and Acquisition of Citizenship at Birth
By statute, citizenship also is extended to certain children born
outside the United States to parents who are U.S. citizens at the time of
the child's birth. 2 This is generally referred to as "acquisition" of
citizenship at birth. To acquire citizenship at birth, generally at least one
parent must have been a U.S. citizen at the time of the child's birth and
have been physically present in the United States for a requisite period
of time at some point prior to the birth. 43 Child custody potentially plays
a role in acquisition because the law employs a distinction between
children born in wedlock and those not, similar to that discussed in the
immigration context above.2"
Though acquisition of citizenship takes place at birth, certain actions
239. Thronson, supra note 50, at 83; see also MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS ORDER CODE: U.S. CITIZENSHIP OF PERSONS BORN IN THE UNITED STATES TO
ALIEN PARENTS IO-18 (2005), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33079-20050913.pdf;
Brooke Kirkland, Note, Limiting the Application of Jus Soli: The Resulting Status of Undocumented
Children in the United States, 12 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 197, 197-99 (2006) (describing proposals to
limit jus soli citizenship).
240. Children born in the United States to diplomats generally are accorded permanent residence
status. See 8 C.F.R. § 101.3 (2007).
241. See Peter H. Schuck, The Re-Evaluation of American Citizenship, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. I, it
(1997) ("United States citizenship, once acquired, is virtually impossible to lose without the citizen's
express consent.").
242. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2000).
243. See id. § 1401(c)-(g). Because acquisition of citizenship occurs only at birth, its provisions are
not applicable for adopted children in relation to an adoptive U.S. citizen parent.
244. See supra notes i6o, 17o-75 and accompanying text. The relevant statutory section for
children born out of wedlock is 8 U.S.C. § 14o9 and "applies to all persons born on or after November
14, 1986, its effective date and.., to persons who had not attained age 18 as of November 14, 1986,
except those who had previously been legitimated, to whom 'old' [8 U.S.C. § 14o9] applies." FOREIGN
AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 189, § 1133.4-2(a)(I) (1998).
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are required to prove and retain the U.S. citizenship so acquired. This
hopefully happens early, though it may be delayed, and age limits for
some of the requirements place the process on a clock. In order for
persons245 born out of wedlock to a U.S.-citizen father to establish that
they acquired citizenship at birth, among the elements they must
demonstrate are that "the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing
to provide financial support for the person until the person reaches the
age of i8 years ,' ' 46 and
while the person is under the age of i8 years-
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's
residence or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing or
under oath, or
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a
competent court. 
47
These are not particularly onerous requirements, though satisfaction
requires action on the part of the father and a child cannot meet these
without the father's participation.
Awareness is essential to formal compliance with these
requirements, because it is unlikely for a father to "satisfy [these
requirements] incidentally without knowledge of the law. ' ' ,48 For
example, that "the father actually provide financial support is not
enough; he must agree in writing to do So. ' '149 Moreover, the
requirements must be met prior to the child reaching age eighteen.5 The
result is that the father's pledge of financial support is absolutely
required even though it might be essentially meaningless if entered as the
child nears age eighteen.25' Even where the agreement is executed while
the child is young, if a father "subsequently fails to support the child, the
245. Using the term "person" instead of "child" might indicate that any limitations on the parent-
child relationship inherent in the citizenship definition of child and not specifically required in this
section are irrelevant. Still, the term "father" is used and is defined solely in relation to the definition
of child. See 8 U.S.C. § I ioi(c)(2) (2000).
246. Id. § 1409(a)(3).
247. Id. § 1409(a)(4).
248. David A. Isaacson, Correcting Anomalies in the United States Law of Citizenship by Descent,
47 ARIZ. L. REV. 313, 333 (2005).
249. Id. at 333-34-
250. Id. at 334 n.89 (noting that the "text of [8 U.S.C. § 1409] does not explicitly require that the
promise be made before the child turns eighteen at all, though the State Department's Foreign Affairs
Manual rules out the possibility of a father signing a meaningless lapsed promise after that time"); see
also FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note i89, § 1133. 4 -2.b(3)(c)(v) (1998).
251. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 189, § I33.4-2.b(3)(c)(v) (1998) (stating that
agreement must be dated any time prior to child's eighteenth birthday).
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child's U.S. citizenship is not taken away. '
Legitimation, with its occasional requirements involving child
custody, may be a part of demonstrating acquisition of citizenship. But
with some awareness of the requirements, the quirky requirements of
legitimation are avoidable and acquisition likely is much more easily
obtained through the other options of acknowledging or adjudicating
paternity. Family court judges or attorneys could make an important
contribution to a child's interests in a qualifying case by recognizing the
need for and benefit from a written agreement and formal adjudication
of paternity in a custody dispute."3 Moreover, if an agreement such as
§ 1409 contemplates has been executed, it may have relevance regarding
child support matters.254
3. Child Custody and Derivation of Citizenship
Persons not born as U.S. citizens may qualify to naturalize as citizens
after obtaining and holding permanent resident status for a requisite
number of years, generally five, and meeting a host of other
requirements, including being at least eighteen years of age.255 Although
children are prohibited from naturalizing on their own, under certain
circumstances children may "derive" U.S. citizenship from a parent's
naturalization."' The distinction between acquisition and derivation is
that acquisition involves a parent who was a U.S. citizen at the time of
the child's birth, and derivation involves a parent who was not a citizen at
the time of birth but later naturalizes.
Derivation of citizenship statutes have changed over time and it is
important to look at the relevant effective dates of statutory provisions.
For older children and adults, prior versions of derivation statutes may
be applicable. Enacted as the Child Citizen Act of 2000,257 the current
statute provides:
A child born outside of the United States automatically becomes a
citizen of the United States when all of the following conditions have
been fulfilled:
252. Id. § 1133.4-2.b(3)(e) (noting that while the Department of State "has no authority to obtain
payments pursuant to [8 U.S.C. § I4o9(a)]... [t]his does not mean ... that it could not be enforced by
the child against the father, or pursuant to laws administered by other government entities").
253. See, e.g., Recommendations, supra note 97 ("In juvenile justice and child welfare proceedings,
children's attorneys should understand the interconnections to other related substantive areas, such as
health, housing, public benefits, education, domestic violence, immigration, and transnational
issues.").
254. See Abrams, Immigration Law, supra note 26, at 1700-07 (discussing affidavits of support
executed in the context of immigration based on marriage).
255. See 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (2000).
256. See id. §§ 1431, 1433.
257. See Child Citizen Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. lO6-395, 114 Stat. 1631 (2ooo).
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(I) At least one parent of the child is a citizen of the United
States, whether by birth or naturalization.
(2) The child is under the age of eighteen years.
(3) The child is residing in the United States in the legal and
physical custody of the citizen parent pursuant to a lawful
admission for permanent residence.5S
Moreover, this section "shall apply to a child adopted by a United
States citizen parent if the child satisfies the requirements applicable to
adopted children under section i ioi(b)(i)."25 9 This extends the provision
to cover many children adopted abroad who are not included in the
citizenship definition of "child.''260 The statute put in place by the Child
Citizenship Act represented a major revision, shifting from a general
requirement that both parents naturalize to a requirement of only one
parent and thus significantly liberalizing derivation. The "key to the
[passage of the Child Citizenship Act] was the notion that foreign-born
adopted children should be granted United States citizenship as
efficiently as possible as a way to establish parity between adopted and
biological children and to eliminate the possibility of deportation in the
future.",,6,
For children of parents who are successful in navigating through the
immigration and naturalization system, this statute provides a potentially
quick route to citizenship. To be sure, the children must first become
permanent residents. 62 But if the other requirements are met, the
children of U.S. citizens, including those just arriving after an adoption
abroad, become U.S. citizens the instant those children become
permanent residents.
One of those other requirements is that the "child is residing in the
United States in the legal and physical custody of the citizen parent.
' 63
There is a glut of litigation regarding legitimation and legal custody in
the derivation-of-citizenship context. In contrast to most all of
258. 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (2o00).
259. Id. § 1431(b).
260. See id. § iIoi(c)(i).
261. Victor C. Romero, The Child Citizenship Act and the Family Reunification Act: Valuing the
Citizen Child as Well as the Citizen Parent, 55 FLA. L. REV. 489,5oo-o I (2003) ("Most adults wanting to
adopt in the United States are white, and most children waiting to be adopted, both domestically and
internationally, are nonwhite. Thus, many adoptive American families are likely to be ones in which
the parents are white and the adopted children are nonwhite. Viewed from this perspective, it is easy
to see why the [Child Citizenship Act] was so positively received. Many of the white senators and
representatives easily identified with the white United States citizen parents who wanted to make sure
their nonwhite adopted children were United States citizens.").
262. See 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a)(3) (2000); see also 7 GORDON ET AL., supra note 125.
263. 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a)(3).
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immigration and nationality law, when all the various requirements to
derive citizenship are met, the derivation is complete automatically
without the need for formal adjudication and without regard to whether
the person who derived citizenship is aware of the derivation. 64 This
leaves much room for ex post facto litigation, often by persons facing
removal for criminal conduct who attempt to defeat removal by
establishing that they actually are U.S. citizens. With cases frequently
arising in this not particularly sympathetic posture, and involving facts
from years or decades in the past, a predictable lack of generosity
generally reigns in the interpretation of derivation statutes.
Most current litigation is related to the version of this statute that
preceded the Child Citizenship Act, affecting persons who reached age
eighteen before February 27, 2001. Under this prior relevant statutory
provision, derivation of citizenship required the naturalization of both
parents or the "naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the
child when there has been a legal separation of the parents or the
naturalization of the mother if the child was born out of wedlock and the
paternity of the child has not been established by legitimation.
' '
,
65
Without delving too deeply, a brief review of these lines of cases gives
some insight into how child custody has been interpreted in the
derivation-of-citizenship context. Some issues are potentially resolved by
the current statute, though some may carry forward.
a. Legitimation Revisited
Turning first to children born out of wedlock, a person seeking to
establish derivation of citizenship under the prior statute based on a
mother's naturalization often has the strange goal of proving that
legitimation did not take place because under the prior law "a child
whose paternity has not been established by legitimation before the age
of sixteen may derive citizenship through the mother. '' 66 If legitimation
occurred, then the naturalization of both parents would be required to
establish derivation67
264. For example, Duarnis Saul Perez was deported in 1996 based on a criminal conviction and
then arrested "as he attempted to return to the United States. He pleaded guilty to one count of illegal
reentry after removal" and "served his entire 57-month sentence before discovering he is an American
[citizen] and therefore could not be an illegal alien." John Caher, Government Opposes Habeas for
'Innocent' Man, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 16, 2oo6, at I. However, "citizenship was automatically conferred on
Mr. Perez in 1988, when his mother became a U.S. citizen. Even his mother was not aware of her son's
citizenship, and, in fact, advised both Mr. Perez and his attorneys that the man was not an American."
Id.
265. 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) (1994) (repealed 2000).
266. FIELD MANUAL, supra note 198, § 71.i(d)(3) (2007).
267. See In re Rowe, 23 1. & N. Dec. 962, 967 (B.I.A. 2oo6) ("Because the respondent's parents
never married, we agree that his paternity was not established through legitimation. Consequently, we
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Given that legitimacy may be established by operation of a general
law eliminating distinctions between children born in and out of
wedlock,' 6' children may be deemed legitimate even if they have no
relationship with their father, and this can bar derivation based on the
mother's naturalization alone. For example, a man "was born out of
wedlock in El Salvador, and his father acknowledged paternity on the
respondent's birth certificate. [He is] considered a legitimated child
under El Salvadoran law. Without proof that his father is deceased, the
respondent cannot establish derivative citizenship through the 1986
naturalization of his mother.
'269
The current statute's requirement of only one parent naturalizing
should remove the need to argue against legitimacy for children who are
covered by it. There will be, however, persons born out of wedlock who
will wish to establish legitimation to derive citizenship under the current
statute based on the naturalization of their fathers. Because the
citizenship definition of "child" does not include many avenues to
establish a parent-child relationship, legitimation may be the only
available route.
b. Legal Custody and Separation
The second area of litigation has involved the prior statute's grant of
derivative citizenship upon the naturalization of "the parent having legal
custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the
parents." 7' First, if there has been no marriage there is no legal
separation and the case is back in the realm discussed in the previous
section. This statutory language has prompted questions about when a
child is in a parent's legal custody in the wake of vague language or
silence regarding child custody in family court decrees dissolving
marriages. Courts have tended to look "to state law to decide who has
legal custody of a minor for derivative citizenship purposes"" ' or to look
for a "judicial determination" and if none is found then "the parent in
'actual uncontested custody' is deemed to have legal custody.""27 Either
of these approaches cautions advocates and family courts to seek clarity
in decisions regarding child custody to avoid needless litigation and
hold that the respondent derived United States citizenship under former section 321(a)(3) upon the
naturalization of his mother.").
268. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
269. In re Landaverry-Avelar, File No. A42 475 573, 2006 WL 3922208, at *i (B.I.A. Dec. 14,
2006).
270. 8 U.S.C. § 1432 (994) (repealed 2000).
271. Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 2005). In Bagot, the custody order at issue was a
two-page form order on which the father's name was typed into the space before the preprinted words
"shall have custody of the children" on the form. Id. at 254.
272. Bagot, 398 F.3d at 259.
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unintended results.
By regulatory definition in this context, "[l]egal custody refers to the
responsibility for and authority over a child. 27 3 Further,
[j]oint custody, in the case of a child of divorced or legally separated
parents, means the award of equal responsibility for and authority over
the care, education, religion, medical treatment, and general welfare of
a child to both parents by a court of law or other appropriate
government entity pursuant to the laws of the state or country of
residence. 74
Under prior law, an award of sole or joint custody can matter, as
demonstrated in the next section.
c. Sole Custody and Joint Custody
Recently, the Fifth Circuit reviewed a derivative citizenship claim
involving a divorce decree that awarded a "mother 'sole physical
custody' of Petitioner, but awarded both . . . parents 'joint legal
custody."'275 The court held that
§ 1432(a)(3)'s requirement that 'the parent having legal custody of the
child' be a naturalized citizen of the United States is satisfied only
when but one of two living and legally separated parents is a
naturalized U.S. citizen and that parent is vested with the sole legal
custody of the child. 6
In reaching this conclusion, the court placed enormous emphasis on the
use of "the singular form of 'parent"' in allowing a child to derive
citizenship from the naturalization of "'the parent having legal custody of
the child.', 2  If, said the court, Congress had intended that the
"requirements could be met when two legally separated parents shared
joint legal custody of a child and only one of those two parents was
naturalized, it could have used more inclusive language to signify as
much.,,7'
In reaching its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit adopted a decidedly
parent-centered approach, asserting that "Congress meant.., to protect
the rights of both parents for as long as each one of them has legal rights
over the child."279 "'It makes sense ... that when the child's parents are
still married, the child does not automatically acquire a new citizenship
273. 8 C.F.R. § 320.1 (2007).
274. Id.
275. Bustamante-Barrera v. Gonzalez, 447 F.3d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2006).
276. Id. at 398.
277. See id. at 396.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 397.
[Vol. 59:453
CUSTODY AND CONTRADICTIONS
upon the naturalization of only one parent.' 2"8 Only with sole custody in
one parent established "could the federal courts be confident that the
non-custodial, non-naturalized parent truly has no rights over the
child. ' ',8' The Fifth Circuit drew support from the Ninth Circuit which
stated:
[W]e think that Congress generally intended to provide automatic
citizenship to children born abroad of alien parents only after the
naturalization of both biological parents. This policy is rational for at
least a few reasons, but we need only discuss one rationale here: the
protection of parental rights. If United States citizenship were
conferred to a child where one parent naturalized, but the other parent
remained an alien, the alien's parental rights could be effectively
extinguished. . . . Thus, [former 8 U.S.C. § 1432] prevents the
naturalizing parent from usurping the parental rights of the alien
parent." '
First, this reasoning relies on an effort to inaccurately conflate a
parent's citizen status with parental rights. There is simply no reason to
think that by granting U.S. citizenship the "alien's parental rights could
be effectively extinguished." As discussed above, noncitizen parents have
equal parental rights without regard to the status of themselves and that
of their children.283 If the court's logic were correct, there would be cause
for grave concern now that the current statute accomplishes derivation
based on the naturalization of one parent.
Second, although the current statute permits derivation when "[a]t
least one parent of the child is a citizen of the United States ' ' it uses the
same language of the prior statute that the child still must reside "in the
United States in the legal and physical custody of the citizen parent."285
The limiting "when there has been a legal separation of the parents"
language of the old statute is gone, so an interpretation of the same
singular "the" that so impressed the Bustamante court in the same way
would require sole custody before derivation could be complete. This
would mean that children of an intact couple with shared custody of their
children could not derive citizenship on the basis of one parent's
naturalization. Such an interpretation would undermine the reform most
central to the Child Citizenship Act.
To date, the government has agreed that sole custody is not required
280. Id. (quoting Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d 415,425-26 (5th Cir. 2001)) (alteration in original).
281. Id. at 398.
282. Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d io62, io66 (9th Cir. 2003).
283. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
284. 8 U.S.C. § 143 1(a)(i) (2000).
285. Id. § 1431(a)(3) (emphasis added).
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under the current statute and for children living with both parents, with a
surviving parent or with a legitimating parent, with regard to the legal
custody requirement, "the [U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services]
will presume that a U.S. citizen parent has 'legal custody' of a child ...
absent evidence to the contrary. '286 A "child born out of wedlock who
has not been legitimated may acquire citizenship through his or her
naturalizing mother.""7 The Code of Federal Regulations states:
In the case of a child of divorced or legally separated parents, [U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services] will find a U.S. citizen parent to
have legal custody of a child, for the purpose of the [Child Citizenship
Act], where there has been an award of primary care, control and
maintenance of a minor to a parent by a court of law or other
appropriate government entity."'
Additionally, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services "will consider a
U.S. citizen parent who has been awarded 'joint custody' to have legal
custody of a child. ' '
Child custody remains highly relevant in the citizenship context. It
also is important to note that the Child Citizenship Act of 2000
introduced the term "physical custody" into the mix for the first time
with no mention of the reason for this in the legislative record. There has
yet been no attempt to define "physical custody" by regulation or judicial
opinion, and it has largely been assumed to be coextensive with residence
as used in the adoption context discussed above.
D. REVEALING VALUES
Tracing the role of child custody through immigration and
nationality provides insights into the nature and values expressed in
immigration law's treatment of children. It reveals a system
fundamentally at odds with the child-centered values of family law.
Families are organized around parents and their interests, children are
denied agency, and designation as children is expressly reserved for
some, but not all, children. The parent-centered nature of immigration
law fails to acknowledge the central role of children as organizing forces
in families with their own needs and interests.
Even on its own terms, the crazy conglomeration of provisions that
determine who is a "child" for immigration law purposes and the erratic
role of child custody in this determination are open to criticism. Sheer
complexity alone makes the system difficult to administer and creates
286. 8 C.F.R. § 320.1(1) (2007).
287. AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES HANDBOOK § 22:19 (I998).
288. 8 C.F.R. § 320.1(2) (2007).
289. Id.
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meaningless traps for the unwary and misinformed. Immigration law's
inconsistent requirements create an uneven playing field that lacks
reasoned justification for its disparate treatment of children and families.
Further, immigration and nationality law's requirements
demonstrate unprincipled variation. For just a few examples, "legal
custody" is expressly required only for adopted and legitimated children,
and the lengthy two-year period for adoption is not matched in the
legitimacy provision, which is silent on the required duration of legal
custody. Only certain adopted children are expressly required to reside
with a parent. Without rational distinction, becoming a "child" by
adoption must be accomplished before age sixteen, becoming a "child"
as a stepchild or via legitimation must happen before age eighteen, and
becoming a "child" through the other provisions must occur before age
twenty-one unless interpretation is reliant on some state or foreign law
that incorporates an earlier deadline. Cobbled together over decades, the
definition of "child" is central to children's access to the primary avenue
of immigration yet lacks coherent logic in the rigid distinctions it draws.
By making distinctions based on legitimacy, and then looking to the
laws of multiple jurisdictions to determine legitimacy, immigration and
nationality law maintain a distinction rejected elsewhere in the law and
incorporate a constantly shifting and amorphous body of law which is
unnecessarily difficult to ascertain and apply. The result is not just
complexity and extensive litigation, but a marked variation in outcome
for identically situated people in different jurisdictions. Whether children
arrive or are excluded, stay or are removed, can turn on whether they
live in Indiana or Ohio. Immigration and citizenship status may turn
solely on the effective date of foreign legislation in a country that the
children left years ago that eliminates legal distinctions between
legitimate and illegitimate children. This approach allows critical
determinations to turn on laws whose underlying assumptions and values
may not be shared. Immigration and nationality law embrace
meaningless distinctions that are not grounded in principle or logic.
The perpetuation of this unprincipled system is at least partially a
result of the exceptionalism of immigration law and the notion that
immigration law is different with different rules. Exploring the ways in
which immigration law functions as family law can provide insights and
perspective that reveal the manner in which immigration law is less
removed and distinct than it sometimes seems.
III. FROM BOTH SIDES Now
Having now examined the potential for use of immigration status in
child custody matters and traced the role of child custody through
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immigration law, it is obvious that there is massive oversimplification in
the traditional notion that family law is the exclusive province of the
states while immigration law is entirely federal. Without trying to define
the full contours of family law, it certainly includes law that regulates the
relationship between children and their parents."9 Similarly, whatever
the outer boundaries of immigration and nationality law, it certainly
encompasses determinations of who is eligible for authorized
immigration status and citizenship in the United States.29'
As it makes judgments that reveal the boundaries of children's
access to family-sponsored immigration and thus determines which
family members are accorded permission to live within the United States,
immigration law is family law. 92 By deciding whether a particular
relationship between a child and parent is worthy of recognition and
assigning this relevance in immigration law, immigration law regulates
basic family decisions such as where and with whom children will live. It
influences private family decisions and behavior as parents and children
conform their actions to qualifications set forth in immigration law.
Immigration law also operates indirectly as family law when its
conclusions are allowed to influence or determine the outcome of child
custody matters in family courts. At the same time, family law functions
as immigration law when its conclusions are determinative of
immigration rights, when its decisions are manipulated to facilitate
immigration outcomes, or simply when its placement decisions involve
parents residing outside the United States. 93
Exploring the manner in which immigration law functions as family
law in the determination of child custody has real consequence. The
federal government "can only regulate the family when it crafts federal
laws in ways that purport to embody something other than family law,
290. See Adler, supra note 23, at 220 (defining family law as "law which regulates one or more
among a cluster of relationships (whether existing or past), including marriage, non-marital intimate
partnerships, and parenthood"); Hasday, supra note 24, at 871 (adopting a "serviceable" definition of
family law as law that "regulates the creation and dissolution of legally recognized family
relationships, and/or determines the legal rights and responsibilities of family members").
291. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1626 (1992) ("'Immigration
law,' which is commonly defined as the federal law governing the admission and expulsion of aliens,
did not exist in this country until 1875.") (footnotes omitted).
292. See generally Abrams, Immigration Law, supra note 26, at 1700.
293. Family law has been described as "'underneath' other legal fields in the sense that its rules
about roles and duties between men and women, parents and children, families and strangers
historically and conceptually underlie other rules about employment and commerce, education and
welfare, and perhaps the governance of the state." Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything
That Grows:" Towards a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 819, 819.
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such as taxation, social security, pensions, or immigration." 9'
Immigration laws, therefore, may provide "Congress an unusual
opportunity to engage in extensive regulation of an area that would
normally be off limits." '95 For example, immigration law's distinctions
based on legitimacy regulate families by promoting marriage in a manner
that would raise objection if attempted directly2 6 Similarly, requirements
for demonstrating a bona fide parent-child relationship under
immigration law or proving two years of shared residency for acquisition
of citizenship may shape private choices and behavior otherwise
unrelated to immigration.
Masking the regulation of families as immigration law obscures the
nature of the federal government's engagement with families, creating
the risk that overreaching extensions of federal power into the lives of
immigrants and citizens alike escape notice and challenge. Revealing and
exploring the manner in which immigration law functions as family law
enhances transparency and serves as a check on possible abuse of federal
power. Likewise, examining the manner in which family law functions as
immigration law provides fresh insights regarding the appropriate
parameters for the consideration of immigration related issues in child
custody matters. The intersection of family law and immigration law is a
rich space from which to examine the basic tenets and operation of both.
A. IMMIGRATION LAW AS FAMILY LAW-DETERMINING CHILD CUSTODY
Even on its own terms, it is easy to criticize the treatment of children
in immigration law. When immigration law is recognized as family law,
the critique of immigration law's treatment of children intensifies as
family law provides a fresh perspective from which to consider
immigration law's treatment of children.
Castro v. United States, described at the outset of this Article,
demonstrates several aspects of immigration law as family law. Recall
that the Border Patrol refused to take a U.S.-citizen child from her father
as he was repatriated where the mother did not have any state court
order establishing her right to custody as superior, and the child left the
294. Abrams, Immigration Law, supra note 26, at 1700-07; see also Adler, supra note 23, at 255;
Hasday, supra note 24, at 875.
295. Abrams, Immigration Law, supra note 26, at 1632. Congress cannot enact laws that have
"nothing to do with the exclusion of immigrants or the deportation of immigrants, but instead
regulates the lives of citizens." Id. at 1646-47. Beyond "matters of admission, exclusion, and
deportation ... the alien inhabits the domain of territorially present persons where different and more
protective rules against government power apply." Bosniak, supra note 63, at 1097-98.
296. See Brown, supra note 179, at 15o ("[T]o the extent that deterring [extra-marital sexual]
activity is appropriate public policy, it can hardly be argued that punishing the child who results from
the illicit activity, rather than the adults who engaged in that activity, is anything but grossly unfair.").
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country with the father.297 When litigation arose from this case, the court
held that the Border Patrol "did not actually make any 'custody
determination' ... [because it] issued no custody order and made no
determination that [the child] should remain permanently with either her
mother or father. '2 9 Yet plainly, the operation of immigration effectively
functioned to determine the custody of the child for the next three years.
Moreover, perhaps the father's lack of authorized immigration status was
the result of his U.S.-citizen daughter's inability to extend an
immigration benefit to him. Additionally, the arrest in this case was
prompted by a report from the mother who apparently sought to use the
blunt instrument of immigration enforcement in the wake of an
argument between spouses.299
As a matter of immigration law, this case is hardly remarkable. An
unauthorized immigrant was removed along with his child, as happens
everyday. When the immigration law here is viewed as family law,
however, it appears highly unusual. The custody of a child was effectively
determined without process and without any consideration of the
interests of the child. This was possible because the father was amenable
to removal, a conclusion that immigration law also reached without
considering the interests of the child. In fact, immigration law shaped this
situation, from the father's lack of status to the mother's tactics in settling
a dispute. Whatever decision regarding child custody would have
resulted from a family law proceeding is unknown because immigration
law effectively resolved the issue without consideration of any of the
factors that would have been relevant to a court determining the best
interests of the child.
Thinking of immigration law as family law also reveals the extent to
which it is out of step with deeply held societal values and, in some
instances, constitutional principles. Certainly, the decision to make
important regulation of children and families turn on the basis of a
child's birth in or out of wedlock likely would face immediate
constitutional challenge without the insulating veneer of Congress's
plenary power over immigration. This exceptionalism permits
immigration law to avoid the reconsideration of policies often prompted
by both successful and unsuccessful constitutional challenges.
Exposing the ways in which immigration law functions as family law
brings a new perspective to immigration reform debates. The
exceptionalism of immigration law may survive as a constitutional
297. Castro v. United States, No. C-o6-6I, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9440, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9,
2007).
298. Id. at *7.
299. See id. at *2-5.
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matter, but even constitutionally sound immigration laws may be less
palatable politically when the manner in which they function as family
law is the focus. For example, the liberalization of derivation of
citizenship in the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 was legislation prompted
largely by concerns over how immigration law operated as family law,
reaching into white, middle class families with U.S. citizen parents.
The Child Citizenship Act aimed to "avoid some heartbreaking
injustices that have sometimes tragically occurred," such as a parent's
failure to complete paperwork resulting "in their forced separation from
their children under the summary deportation provisions Congress
enacted back in I996."' Deporting children to countries "with which
they have no contact, no ability to speak the language, and no family
known to them is needlessly cruel."3 °' The Child Citizenship Act of 2000
"enjoyed broad bipartisan support chiefly because it helped bridge the
still existing psychological gap between adopted and biological
children."30 ' This rhetoric draws not from immigration law motivations
but rather from family law values. Recasting immigration law as family
law shifted the debate and created an avenue to see reforms of harsh
immigration law as valuing family rather than as undermining border
control.
Family law and immigration law often have fundamentally
conflicting values and prioritize contradictory policies, as is apparent in
immigration law's rejection of the most basic premises of family law
regarding the treatment of children. Immigration law results in decisions
about children that are not motivated in the least by consideration of the
children's best interests. Acknowledging that immigration law functions
as family law provides an opportunity to incorporate family law values
and sensibilities into the immigration reform conversation.
B. FAMILY LAW AS IMMIGRATION LAW
Family law functions as immigration law in a number of ways and
exploration of these can provide fresh insights regarding the appropriate
parameters for the consideration of immigration issues in child custody
matters.
First, and most obviously, family law functions as immigration law
when family courts make child custody decisions that reach across
borders. These are de facto determinations regarding who may stay in
the United States and in this context, family courts "have long done what
300. 146 CONG. REC. H7774, H7 777 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (statement of Rep. Delahunt).
301. Id. at H7778 (statement of Rep. Gejdenson).
302. VICTOR C. ROMERO, ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND EQUALITY IN
AMERICA 53 (2005).
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no immigration court ever could: order U.S. citizens to leave the United
States.""3 3 In some instances leaving the country with family may be
appropriate and in others "reunification may not be the only or the
overriding consideration."3 4 The best interests of the child are not the
motivating factor in immigration determinations, and a family court
proceeding in this situation is likely the only available forum in which
children's voices will be heard and their interests will be taken into
account.
Second, family law creates and enforces relationships that have great
relevance in immigration and nationality law and often are determinative
of immigration and nationality rights. This is true whether the court is
aware of the immigration implications or oblivious to the impact of its
determinations on immigration law. The semantic characterization of a
child custody arrangement may have unanticipated consequences years
later. Family law requirements for legitimation may serve to open or
foreclose immigration possibilities. Family law functions as immigration
regardless of whether it does so intentionally and states cannot claim to
adequately serve children's interests with laws and policies if they have
no idea of the impact that these have in such an important dimension of
many children's lives.
When family courts do consciously manipulate decisions or
proceedings to facilitate immigration outcomes, they certainly are
complicit in the resulting operation of immigration law. Understanding
the immigration law underlying a request to manipulate a family court
outcome is critical. In some instances, the family court can serve to
ameliorate the absence of a child-centered framework in immigration
law. In others, however, the court must be critically aware that the
immigration law at issue is motivated by contradictory values and goals.
Thinking about family law functioning as immigration law prompts
further hesitancy in considering parents' immigration status in child
custody decisions. The negative conclusion of immigration law regarding
a parent's status may be is based on considerations that are anathema to
family law and are the result of a system explicitly geared to serve some,
but not all, children. When a parent's unauthorized status is the result of
an immigration system that fails to take the best interests of children into
account and denies agency to children, incorporating consideration
303. Thronson, supra note 28, at i 191. "A key proposition emerges from these cases that children's
citizenship or immigration status does not override parental decisions to take children out of the
country. In the broader context of the parent-child relationship and the child's emerging autonomy,
immigration and citizenship status alone play a limited role in determining whether children remain in
the United States." Id. at 1193.
304. Bhabha, Not a Sack of Potatoes, supra note 29, at 205.
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related to and arising from the parent's status would validate not only
immigration law's conclusion about the parent's status but also the
premises and system that led to that conclusion.
Immigration and nationality law may continue to be parent-
centered, gender-biased and discriminatory towards children born out of
wedlock, but these immigration law throwbacks should never taint state
judgments to the contrary. An immigration determination based on
objectionable principles is no less objectionable when laundered through
a family court.
CONCLUSION
"[F]ew things in the law are as ephemeral as a child custody
adjudication."3" Children's interests change, as does the world in which
they live. When immigration issues are involved in or impacted by a child
custody determination, however, consequences can be profound and
lasting. While this Article has articulated an argument that consideration
of immigration issues is occasionally appropriate in child custody
determinations, it also should serve as a cautionary tale of the
complexities and potential disasters that can accompany the mixing of
immigration and family law.
Understanding the ways in which immigration and nationality law
devalue children gives further reason to exhibit caution in mixing
immigration and family law in the determination of child custody. As
demonstrated, immigration law can function as family law, yet it does so
in a manner that does not take children's interests into account. If family
law is to function as immigration law, its own principles and values
regarding the centrality of the child's interests must not waver.
305. Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 266 (3d Cir. 2005).
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